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This Article considers the significance and promise of Congress’s unprecedented
codification of the well-known Chevron and Skidmore judicial-deference doctrines
(to which I refer collectively as “Chevmore”). Congress did so in the Dodd-Frank
Act by instructing courts to apply the Skidmore deference factors when reviewing
certain agency-preemption decisions and by referring to Chevron throughout.
This codification is meaningful because it informs the delegation theory that under-
girds Chevmore (i.e., that Congress intends to delegate interpretive primacy over 
statutory interpretation to agencies under Chevron or courts under 
Skidmore). Scholars and at least three Supreme Court Justices have decried the 
judicial inquiry into congressional intent as “fictional” or “fraudulent,” 
arguing that Congress doesn’t think about interpretive primacy, courts don’t 
really try to divine congressional intent, and courts rely upon overbroad 
assumptions as to congressional intent.
Dodd-Frank provides the best direct evidence to date as to congressional intent.
Dodd-Frank reveals that Congress knows of Chevmore, legislates with it in mind,
and acquiesces to its principles. But Dodd-Frank’s preemption provisions—which
give an agency rulemaking power subject to Skidmore review—undermine the
Supreme Court’s recent suggestion that Congress intends agencies to receive inter-
pretive primacy (via Chevron’s more deferential review) whenever they have
rulemaking authority. These insights support earlier precedents that did not treat
rulemaking as a talisman. If courts apply these earlier precedents, Chevmore is
neither fiction nor fraud.
Dodd-Frank also demonstrates Chevmore codification’s promise for addressing
longstanding administrative-law issues. With “Chevron rewards” and “Skidmore
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penalties,” Congress can—as it did in Dodd-Frank—clarify how agencies must act
to obtain Chevron deference, balance “hard look” judicial review with regulatory
ossification, and respond to regulatory capture. Chevmore codification can thereby
become a key legislative tool for overseeing the administrative state.
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INTRODUCTION
The Chevron and Skidmore judicial-review doctrines—to which I
collectively refer as “Chevmore”—are two of the most fascinating and
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confusing tenets of federal administrative law.1 Most scholars and
courts agree on the following broad outlines of each doctrine. When
the more deferential Chevron doctrine applies, courts defer to reason-
able, formalized agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provi-
sions that the agency administers.2 In contrast, when the less
deferential Skidmore doctrine applies, courts defer only to the extent
that the thoroughness, validity, consistency, and overall persuasive-
ness of an agency’s interpretation convinces them to do so.3 But
beyond these broad descriptions, scholars and Supreme Court Justices
continue to dispute numerous foundational and practical issues con-
cerning these judicially-crafted doctrines, such as their origin, applica-
bility, contours, and practical effect.4
1 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). I use the portmanteau Chevmore to
distinguish the judicially-created Chevron and Skidmore judicial-review doctrines from
others, such as those in the Administrative Procedure Act.
2 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, . . . the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” (footnotes
omitted)).
3 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and
opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of [a judgment] . . .
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). That said, Justice Scalia has
argued that Skidmore deference is not deference at all. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 n.6 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To
defer is to subordinate one’s own judgment to another’s. If one has been persuaded by
another, so that one’s judgment accords with the other’s, there is no room for deferral—
only for agreement. Speaking of ‘Skidmore deference’ to a persuasive agency position does
nothing but confuse.”).
4 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) (referring to Chevron’s delegation theory as a “legal
fiction”); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2008)
(arguing that Chevron’s methodology is pluralistic and conciliatory because all leading
theories of the administrative state support deference); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D.
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1238
(2007) (considering how the federal appellate courts apply Skidmore); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737 (2002) (arguing that expertise
should inform judicial deference, not implied delegations of interpretive primacy); Thomas
W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 835 (2001)
(addressing the question of which types of statutes and agency interpretations call for
application of Chevron’s mandatory-deference doctrine); Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (arguing that
Chevron’s delegation theory is a fiction that serves as a background rule for legislative
drafting); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
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After having mostly ignored the (sometimes tedious) Chevmore
debates and longstanding calls to provide guidance,5 Congress has
tentatively entered the fray.6 In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Congress included detailed substantive
and procedural provisions governing the Office of Comptroller of the
Currency’s (OCC) ability to preempt state consumer-financial laws.7
As part of those provisions, Congress instructed courts to review an
agency’s “regulation or order”8 that preempts state law under both
a “substantial evidence” standard (found in the Administrative
Procedure Act or APA)9 and, for the first time, according to the four
Skidmore factors.10 In a savings clause, Congress clarified that limited
judicial deference for preemption decisions did not affect deference to
VA. L. REV. 597, 597 (2009) (arguing that Chevron should be understood as having one
step that considers the reasonableness of agency interpretation). Indeed, some dispute
whether Chevron deference is really any more deferential than the regimes that preceded
it. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 829 (2010)
(“The most striking objective measure of the failure of Chevron is that it does not appear
to have succeeded in substantially increasing the level of deference to agency statutory
interpretation.”). And others have debated whether Skidmore and Chevron are likely to
lead to significantly different outcomes, either compared to one another or compared to
instances in which the Court purports to provide no deference. See, e.g., Hickman &
Krueger, supra, at 1276–79 (considering empirical findings concerning federal appellate
courts’ treatment of Skidmore and comparing those findings to past empirical analyses of
Chevron, Skidmore, and deference more generally); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the
Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011)
(presenting ranges of agency affirmance rates under a variety of doctrinal approaches and
finding that doctrinally-based differences in outcome are “barely detectable,” with the
exception of the Auer doctrine).
5 See, e.g., William Funk, Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023,
1034 (2004) (proposing a congressional bill concerning nonlegislative rules and codifying
Skidmore concepts); Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637,
2640–41 (2003) (suggesting that Congress could periodically clarify via statute when it
delegates lawmaking power to agencies); Ronald M. Levin, Scope of Review Legislation:
The Lessons of 1995, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 647, 653–58 (1996) (detailing a failed
congressional attempt to codify judicial review over administrative decisions). Congress
has provided certain instructions to courts, such as savings clauses, severability clauses, and
preemption clauses. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 1025 n.469 (2013) (providing examples of the Court’s
reliance on savings clauses, severability clauses, and preemption clauses). But these did not
concern Chevmore.
6 Cf. Levin, supra note 5, at 665 (“The diversity of judicial and academic approaches
to review of legal issues may be one reason why legislatures have so uniformly remained
silent about that subject . . . .”).
7 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2012).
8 Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
9 Id. § 25b(c).
10 Id. § 25b(b)(5)(A).
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the OCC’s other statutory interpretations.11 Congress also addressed,
for the first time, Chevron’s applicability to several preexisting statu-
tory schemes.12 This Article is the first to explain how Congress’s
unprecedented Chevmore codification (1) informs Chevmore’s (and
particularly Chevron’s) theoretical foundation and (2) suggests how
Chevmore codification can improve administrative law in the future.
Dodd-Frank informs the much-debated delegation theory13 upon
which Chevron rests.14 Under that theory, courts defer to agencies
when Congress expressly or implicitly intends agencies to have inter-
pretive primacy over courts as to particular ambiguities or “gaps” in a
statutory scheme that the agency administers.15 To divine congres-
sional intent, the Supreme Court has looked primarily to whether
Congress gave agencies (and whether agencies used) the power to act
through formalized procedures, such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudications under the APA.16 But the Court
has also looked to other values, such as “the interstitial nature of the
legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of
the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given
the question over a long period of time”17—factors reminiscent of
Skidmore’s.
11 Id. § 25b(b)(5)(B).
12 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how Congress allocated interpretive primacy in
Dodd-Frank).
13 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 863–72 (discussing key theories for the legal
foundations of Chevron). Skidmore also relies on delegation as a secondary value. See
infra Part I.A (discussing Skidmore).
14 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“[A]dministrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority.”); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011) (affirming Mead); Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler,
The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009
U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1525 (“[T]he Supreme Court has been fairly consistent . . . in
maintaining that congressional delegation is the basis for according [Chevron]
deference . . . .”).
15 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . .
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974))).
16 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal
administrative procedure . . . . Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying
Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication.” (footnotes and citations omitted)).
17 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
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Chevron’s delegation theory has come under broad attack. First,
many scholars—and three Supreme Court Justices—have referred to
the inquiry as “fictional” because they insist that Congress has no
intent at all as to interpretive primacy.18 Second, some have referred
to the Chevron inquiry as “fraudulent,” based on, among other things,
the Court’s overbroad assumptions as to when Congress delegates
interpretive primacy, the Court’s failure to reconcile the Chevmore
doctrines (the Chevron doctrine in particular) with seemingly incon-
sistent provisions in the APA, and the Court’s limited inquiry into
congressional intent.19 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently sug-
gested a less nuanced approach to gleaning Congress’s intent from its
bestowal of agency rulemaking authority. In United States v. Mead,
the Supreme Court indicated that an agency’s use of rulemaking
authority generally suggests that Congress delegated interpretive pri-
macy to agencies.20 But over four Justices’ contrary view,21 the Court,
in City of Arlington v. FCC, recently appeared to go further. The
Court said there, in deciding whether Chevron deference applies to
agencies’ interpretations of their own regulatory jurisdiction, that an
agency’s use of general rulemaking authority always indicates a con-
gressional delegation that warrants Chevron deference without a fur-
ther particularized inquiry.22 Dodd-Frank informs these debates, both
supporting and undermining the Court’s formulation of the delegation
theory.
Dodd-Frank supports the delegation theory by suggesting that
congressional delegation is not fictional and that Congress has acqui-
esced to the Chevmore doctrines. More specifically, Dodd-Frank sug-
gests that Congress does in fact have intent as to interpretive primacy,
generally accepts judicial deference to agency interpretations and the
18 See infra Part I.B.1 (assessing congressional intent as to interpretive primacy).
19 See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing scholarly concerns on these topics).
20 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal
administrative procedure . . . .”).
21 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875–77 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(considering several factors, in addition to rulemaking authority, when deciding that
Chevron deference applies); id. at 1880–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that courts
must look at whether Congress intended to delegate interpretative primacy as to the
statutory provision at issue, but not explaining how courts should determine whether
Congress delegated primacy on a particular matter).
22 See id. at 1874 (majority opinion) (“[W]e differ from the dissent[’s] . . . view that a
general conferral of rulemaking authority does not validate rules for all the matters the
agency is charged with administering.” (emphasis omitted)); id. (“[T]he preconditions to
deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vested the
FCC with general authority to administer the Communications Act through rulemaking
and adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority.”).
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Chevmore regimes, and uses Chevron as a background norm when
drafting. Dodd-Frank does so by codifying Skidmore’s factors, using a
Chevron savings clause for the OCC’s nonpreemption decisions, dis-
cussing its views in legislative history, and relying on other statutory
provisions that render certain agencies eligible for Chevron deference
when multiple agencies administer the same statutory scheme. Relat-
edly, regardless of Chevron’s questionable propriety as an original
matter,23 Dodd-Frank also suggests that Congress has acquiesced to
its general framework and the courts’ Chevmore doctrines. Aside
from the foregoing indicia, Congress’s combined use of Skidmore def-
erence, the APA’s substantial-evidence standard, and oblique refer-
ences to Chevron in the same statutory section suggest that
Congress—at least since 2010—is not troubled by Chevron’s apparent
inconsistency with the APA.24 Congress’s awareness of and acquies-
cence to Chevmore ultimately undermine the conventional belief25
that the delegation theory rests on a legal fiction that fails to reflect
congressional intent.26
Dodd-Frank, nevertheless, likely undermines the Supreme
Court’s apparent assumption in City of Arlington that Congress
always intends to delegate interpretative primacy whenever agencies
exercise (or have) general rulemaking authority. Despite giving the
OCC general and specific power to promulgate preemption regula-
23 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 871 (noting that when “Chevron was
decided, there was no established background understanding that a decision by Congress
to confer general rulemaking or adjudicatory authority on an agency would be deemed a
decision to transfer primary interpretational authority to the agency”).
24 See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV.
113, 193–99 (1998) (arguing that Chevron is inconsistent with the APA); Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 4, at 868 (noting that if Chevron is federal common law, it does not
coexist well with the APA’s judicial-review provisions).
25 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212 (“Because Congress so rarely makes its intentions about deference
clear, Chevron doctrine at most can rely on a fictionalized statement of legislative desire,
which in the end must rest on the Court’s view of how best to allocate interpretive
authority.”); Hickman & Krueger, supra note 4, at 1249 (“Chevron relies on an admittedly
fictional presumption that Congress chose an agency rather than the courts to be the
primary interpreter of a given statutory scheme.”); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s
Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 278 (2011) (“By most accounts, Congress does
not directly address the question of which institution—agency or court—is authorized to
fill gaps or resolve ambiguities in the vast majority of regulatory statutes. In that sense,
congressional intent about interpretive primacy is a fiction.” (footnotes omitted)); Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 192 (2006) (“Both Justices [Breyer and
Scalia] explicitly recognized that any understanding of legislative instructions is a ‘legal
fiction.’” (footnote omitted)).
26 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2014–15 (2011) (arguing that Congress does think about
the delegation of interpretive primacy and that the Mead and Chevron “fictions” are
consistent with legislative interests).
\\jciprod01\productn\n\nyu\90-1\nyu101.txt unknown Seq: 8 30-MAR-15 11:28
8 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1
tions, Congress indicated that Chevron should not apply. Instead,
Congress mandated mere Skidmore deference in light of the OCC’s
history of controversial preemption decisions based on conflict-of-
interest and regulatory-capture concerns.27 Dodd-Frank thus suggests
that, when faced with congressional silence, courts should look
beyond how an agency acts (e.g., through notice-and-comment rules)
and determine why it acts (e.g., whether the action resulted from the
agency using its expertise or something improper) when deciding
which deference regime should apply. I recognize that Dodd-Frank
might reflect Congress’s concern about one particular kind of decision
(preemption) by one particular agency (the OCC). But I contend that
the expertise and anticapture values that drove Congress in Dodd-
Frank have broad application across the federal administrative state,
and thus they provide insight into congressional intent when Congress
fails to state expressly whether agencies have interpretive primacy.
Because Congress has indicated that agency structure and expertise
are relevant to whether Chevron applies, Dodd-Frank suggests that
the City of Arlington majority’s rulemaking-is-dispositive approach
goes too far if it seeks to reflect congressional intent.28 Instead, the
more nuanced position in Mead (and the concurring and dissenting
opinions in City of Arlington) is more faithful to congressional intent
and ultimately provides a better default principle. If this is true, the
Chevron inquiry into congressional delegation as understood before
City of Arlington is not fraudulent because, consistent with congres-
sional intent, it respectfully considers, but does not genuflect to, an
agency’s rulemaking authority.
Chevmore codification also holds promise for addressing long-
standing administrative-law issues. Depending on agency behavior,
Congress can reward agencies with Chevron deference (i.e., offer a
“Chevron reward”) or penalize them with Skidmore deference (i.e.,
give a “Skidmore penalty”) when neither regime would otherwise
apply. In doing so, Congress can first use Chevmore codification to
clarify which forms of agency action it intends to receive Chevron def-
27 See infra Part II.B (discussing the OCC and capture).
28 City of Arlington’s treatment of Skidmore and Mead in other ways has already come
to scholars’ attention. See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Chevron Step Zero After City of
Arlington, 140 TAX NOTES 713, 720 (2013) (highlighting how City of Arlington should be
viewed as abrogating Mead’s open-ended inquiry into whether Chevron applies); Peter L.
Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 792, 796–98 (2014) (arguing that
City of Arlington may presage the end of Skidmore because, without referencing Skidmore
at all, the majority sought to give Chevron deference and the dissent sought to give no
deference at all).
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erence29 and thereby resolve questions lingering after Mead as to how
an agency must act to receive Chevron deference. Second, Congress
can also domesticate the vague and often criticized “hard look”
review. Hard look review signifies intensive judicial review into an
agency’s explanation, its inquiry into a particular issue, and its
response to all material comments.30 Although its advocates argue
that it encourages rational (not politicized) decisionmaking,31 its
critics assert that it “ossifies” agency action because agencies must
provide voluminous explanations and administrative records to pre-
vail on judicial review.32 Congress can determine that more intensive
review is better for some questions than others without resolving the
debate. To that end, Congress can require Skidmore deference when it
wants courts to take a close look at agency action, and, conversely, it
can use Chevron deference to limit hard look review and allow agen-
cies more autonomy.33 Third, Congress can use Chevmore codification
to mitigate regulatory capture by mandating Skidmore deference for
suspect agencies, such as the OCC.34 Ultimately, Chevmore codifica-
tion gives Congress an additional tool for agency oversight.
29 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (leaving unresolved which
agency actions entitle an agency to Chevron deference); id. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s focus on the formality of agency action); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1445
(2005) (“Years have passed since Mead was decided, and we still lack a clear answer to the
question when an agency is entitled to Chevron deference for procedures other than
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”).
30 See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 397 (2000) (“[T]he essence of hard look
review is a requirement that agencies fully explain their actions, taking into account all
relevant factors, and responding to all material comments.”).
31 See William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and
the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1528
(2009) (“Hard look review serves as a powerful antidote to politicized agency
decisionmaking . . . .”); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV.
483, 490–91 (1997) (arguing that hard look review should not be discarded because it better
ensures that agencies act in a deliberative way that furthers proper public interests).
32 See Jordan, supra note 30, at 395 (describing critics’ views); see also Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385,
1419 (1992) (“The predictable result of stringent ‘hard look’ judicial review of complex
rulemaking is ossification.”); Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science
Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733,
750 n.85 (2011) (listing proponents and detractors of the theory that hard look review
causes ossification).
33 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REV. 59, 72 (1995) (suggesting Chevron can limit ossification).
34 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 26 (2010) (“[J]udicial review may help to police the original
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Three key caveats apply. First, to be sure, divining a multi-
member body’s collective intent is a difficult and contested enter-
prise.35 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has founded Chevron and its
delegation theory on congressional intent.36 For purposes of this
Article, I accept the delegation theory and consider how Congress, in
Dodd-Frank, revealed its likely intent as to Chevmore through text,
legislative history, and context. Second, to be sure, Congress’s first
(and only) codification of the Chevmore doctrines is merely a single
data point. But it is an extremely significant one, informed by histor-
ical context, legislative history, and statutory design. Indeed, because
this codification is unprecedented37 and concerns the largest overhaul
to the administrative state in decades, Dodd-Frank provides especially
important insight. To ignore Chevmore’s codification would under-
mine Chevmore’s doctrinal and theoretical basis by overlooking
Congress’s most direct participation in the Chevmore debates and
relying instead on silence or political theory.38 And third, to be sure,
Congress could attack outstanding administrative-law issues in other
ways. But its failure to do so and its recent use of Chevmore as a
legislative tool suggest that Chevmore codification provides a prag-
matic approach worth considering.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes, as relevant to
Dodd-Frank, the primary theoretical and doctrinal bases for
Chevmore deference, and key issues that surround Chevmore (and
Chevron in particular). Part II considers how and why Congress codi-
fied Chevmore in Dodd-Frank. Part III argues that Chevmore codifi-
cation provides evidence that Congress knows of and has acquiesced
to the judicially created Chevmore doctrines. This Part also argues
that Dodd-Frank reveals that Congress considers more than
rulemaking authority necessary for Chevron deference. Part IV then
considers how Congress can use Chevmore codification to mitigate
substantive framework of the statute, so it, too, can be a line of defense against capture to
the extent that the original standard itself has those aims.”).
35 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 2047 (discussing legal realists’ criticism of judicial
attempts to discover legislative intent).
36 See id. at 2016 (“The [Chevron] Court justified judicial deference primarily on a
theory of congressional delegation: Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority to
the agency whenever it fails to resolve the meaning of particular statutory language.”); see
also infra Part I.B (describing how the Court relied on congressional intent).
37 Cf. Garrett, supra note 5, at 2640 (“To the extent that anyone mentions the
possibility of greater congressional involvement [in legislating Chevron], it is quickly
dismissed because Congress seldom provides explicit instructions allocating this sort of
policymaking authority. In addition, it is seen as unrealistic to expect that Congress will
improve its performance.” (footnote omitted)).
38 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 2028–29, 2041–43 (noting scholars’ criticism of
judicial reliance on congressional silence and turning instead to political theory).
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lingering administrative-law issues. Ultimately, this Article joins the
recent, growing recognition of Congress’s useful role in refining and
validating Chevmore39 and concludes that, in light of Dodd-Frank,




Chevron and Skidmore affect whether agencies or courts have
interpretive primacy over statutory ambiguities and rest upon dif-
ferent, yet overlapping, bases. When courts apply Skidmore, they
maintain interpretive primacy but consider agency views. Courts do so
because of agencies’ administrative expertise and notions of congres-
sional intent. Chevron, for its part, applies when Congress has dele-
gated interpretive primacy to an agency. Administrative expertise
informs the likelihood of congressional delegation. Despite the impor-
tance of congressional intent to Chevron’s delegation theory,
Congress has rarely provided any guidance. In light of legislative
silence, courts generally consider what a reasonable legislator would
do. As I discuss infra in Part I.B., several scholars have questioned
whether Congress has any intent as to interpretive primacy, whether
the Court has correctly interpreted congressional intent, and whether
the courts’ underlying assumptions (including which indicia are rele-
vant to gleaning congressional intent) are accurate.
A. Skidmore and the APA
Skidmore is grounded in notions of expert agency decision-
making.40 In 1944, the Court considered standards for defining
working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act in Skidmore v. Swift
& Co.41 The Labor Department encouraged a “flexible” analysis con-
cerning an employee’s duty to determine when overtime pay was
due.42 The Court held that deference to the agency was appropriate if
the agency’s interpretation represented a “body of experience and
39 See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 5, at 993–98 (describing results and
implications of a survey of legislative drafters about their awareness of and agreement with
administrative-law doctrines); cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2129–31 (2002) (discussing Congress’s ability to
enact interpretive statutes).
40 See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 4, at 1293 (noting that “comparative agency
expertise and the potential for arbitrariness in the exercise of that expertise” are central to
Skidmore review).
41 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135–36 (1944).
42 Id. at 138.
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informed judgment.”43 Later, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Mead held that expertise is necessary for Skidmore to apply because
deference is appropriate only when “the regulatory scheme is highly
detailed, and [the agency] can bring the benefit of specialized experi-
ence to bear.”44
Not only must the agency have expertise, but it must apply it. In
interpreting a statute, the Court evaluates the agency’s use of exper-
tise by considering certain factors: “the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade.”45 Thorough decisions suggest that the agency weighed (and
discussed) various factors and alternatives,46 and the decision’s rea-
soning lends itself to an evaluation of the agency’s argument for why it
weighed the factors or alternatives as it did. Consistent decision-
making suggests that agency interpretations do not change with the
political winds but are, instead, based on data and experience.47 In
short, the use of agency expertise is central to Skidmore deference’s
applicability and effect.48
Merely two years after Skidmore, in 1946, Congress enacted the
APA. The APA has judicial-review provisions that, among other
things, call for a “reviewing court [to] decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”49 The
APA directs courts to set aside agency action or findings that are,
among other things, “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
43 Id. at 140.
44 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001).
45 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
46 Courts have looked at how the agency acts in two ways: either the extensiveness of
the inquiry or the formality of the agency’s process. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 4,
at 1281–82 (describing these approaches).
47 Of course, agency interpretations could change based on new data or experiences,
but presumably the agency would discuss the new information that leads to a different
interpretation. See generally FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–16
(2009) (holding that the APA does not require more substantial explanations for changes
in agency position than it does for initial actions, although agencies must ordinarily display
awareness that they are changing position and provide a reasoned explanation for the
change).
48 See A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Holland, 472 F.3d 148, 169 (4th Cir. 2006) (denying
Skidmore deference because the agency had “developed virtually no experience that might
be considered a ‘body of experience and informed judgment’”); Hickman & Krueger,
supra note 4, at 1293 (noting the emphasis on agency expertise in Skidmore review);
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 855 (“Under Skidmore, however, it does not matter
whether Congress has delegated authority to an agency to administer the statute as long as
the agency has relevant expertise.”).
49 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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otherwise not in accordance with law; . . . in excess of statutory juris-
diction, authority, or limitations . . . ; [or] unsupported by substantial
evidence” for certain formal agency actions.50 Despite the APA’s
failure to refer to deference, scholars have generally been comfortable
with Skidmore’s application to judicial review of statutory interpreta-
tion.51 Even when Skidmore deference applies, courts retain interpre-
tive primacy—and thereby decide “all relevant questions of law”—by
being able to reject agencies’ interpretations if they fail to persuade as
products of agency expertise.52
Although courts retain interpretive primacy under Skidmore
review, Congress’s intent as to an agency’s role in interpretation is
relevant. Skidmore deference relies upon express or implied congres-
sional delegation because Congress, unless it says otherwise, very
likely intends courts to rely upon agency expertise, where evident, in
interpreting statutes. After all, when Congress instructs courts not to
defer to agency interpretations,53 the Fourth Circuit has suggested that
Skidmore deference should not apply.54 Because Congress signals
50 Id. § 706(2).
51 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1441, 1464 (2008) (“Consistent with the APA and the traditional role of judges
when interpreting statutes, Skidmore suggests that judges should take into consideration
agency inputs, especially when they reflect the agency’s expert judgment and longstanding
practice.”); Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.: More Pieces for the
Chevron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 699, 714 (2002) (“[E]ven where a
court is entitled or required to exercise de novo review of an agency’s interpretation of a
statute [as under the APA], the court would be hard pressed not to consider the agency’s
interpretation, or use the Skidmore factors, in arriving at what it considered the correct
interpretation.”); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1155–56 (2012)
(arguing that “Skidmore weight” is permissible under the APA’s review provisions). But
see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 840 n.32 (noting that deference is inappropriate
when a statute calls for de novo review).
52 See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1998 (2008)
(“[U]nder Skidmore v. Swift & Co., and its progeny, the agency can opt for procedurally
simpler enactment but surrenders interpretive primacy to courts.” (footnote omitted));
Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1554 (2006) (“[B]y bringing Skidmore back into the
deference lexicon, Mead appropriately precludes Chevron deference from impermissibly
encroaching upon the function that Congress, through the APA, intended courts to
serve.”); Strauss, supra note 51, at 1155–56 (noting that courts can accord Skidmore weight
to agency views when deciding matters of statutory interpretation).
53 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 8302(c)(3) (2012) (instructing the D.C. Circuit not to defer to
certain agencies when deciding whether a challenged rule or order conflicts with certain
statutory provisions).
54 See Cline v. Hawke, 51 F. App’x 392, 396 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying Skidmore
deference to an OCC insurance-preemption decision because it predated enactment of a
statutory provision instructing review “without unequal deference” to questions of state
and federal law).
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when agencies should not receive deference (including even Skidmore
deference) and because courts appear receptive to these signals, Skid-
more deference is also founded upon congressional intent.
B. Chevron
Chevron deference has proved more problematic than Skidmore
deference, both in terms of its foundation and its consistency with the
APA. The Court in Chevron deferred to the Environmental
Protection Agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statu-
tory term in the Clean Air Act.55 The Court relied primarily upon a
delegation theory, i.e., that Congress delegated the responsibility of
interpreting ambiguous terms under the Act to the EPA.56 This dele-
gation can be express or implicit.57 The Court examined the context
surrounding the Clean Air Act’s passage, the Act itself, and its legisla-
tive history, and determined that none of these provided clear gui-
dance about congressional intent as to the meaning of the term at
issue.58 The Court provided little guidance on how courts should infer
congressional intent going forward or exactly what role legislative his-
tory and context played in its analysis.59 The Court also did not
directly discuss the normative basis for its delegation theory, but it
suggested that certain values—such as agency expertise and political
accountability—supported the Court’s inference that Congress
intended agencies, not courts, to have interpretive primacy over
ambiguous statutory provisions.60
Since Chevron, the Supreme Court has consistently relied on this
delegation theory. For instance, in 1990 the Court relied on delegation
as a “precondition” to Chevron deference in Adams Fruit Co. v.
Barrett.61 A decade later, the Court relied only on the delegation
theory in United States v. Mead for Chevron deference,62 and it has
55 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
56 Id. at 843–44, 865.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 845–64.
59 See Beermann, supra note 4, at 815 (“Another problem with the Chevron doctrine is
that the Court is unclear about the relevance of legislative history and policy to judicial
review of interpretive decisions.”).
60 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–86 (discussing why agencies are better placed than the
judiciary to make policy choices in the context of resolving a statutory ambiguity); Duffy,
supra note 24, at 191 (“[T]he Court ultimately supported its deference principle [in
Chevron] with two intertwined policy reasons—agency expertise and democratic
accountability.”).
61 Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Act of Nov. 15, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-49, 109 Stat. 432.
62 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
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continued to rely on the delegation rationale in subsequent cases.63
But even though delegation theory reigns supreme, the Court has
referred to other values, such as expertise and deliberative process.64
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has relied on agency expertise in extending
Chevron to agencies’ interpretations of contractual (as opposed to
statutory) language.65 The Court has been silent, however, about
whether these other values are meaningful by themselves or merely
inform congressional intent to delegate interpretive primacy.
That the Supreme Court relies (at least in part) on the delegation
theory is not contested.66 Instead, as I describe below, the main points
of debate are whether Congress has any intent as to interpretive pri-
macy to divine, whether the Court accurately deciphered Congress’s
intent, and whether clear rules or flexible standards should inform
how courts ascertain congressional intent going forward. As I discuss
infra in Part III, Dodd-Frank informs each point of debate.
1. Does Congress Have Any Intent as to Interpretive Primacy?
First, some scholars contend that the Supreme Court’s inquiry
attempts to do the impossible—glean legislative intent from a legisla-
ture that has no view on interpretive primacy.67 Jack Beermann has
challenged the view that “Congress actually considers the particulars
of the Chevron doctrine when it writes statutes.”68 Likewise, now-
Judge David Barron and now-Justice Elena Kagan noted that
63 See, e.g., Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033–34 (2012) (holding
that the Court should defer to the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of the
statute because Congress had delegated rulemaking authority to the agency on the issue);
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011)
(explaining that congressional intent to delegate controls the deference inquiry); cf. United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, L.L.C., 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843–44 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (finding that Congress had not left a gap to be filled so the agency interpretation
was not entitled to deference).
64 See Criddle, supra note 4, at 1308–10 (discussing the Court’s reliance on deliberative
process and expertise in deciding whether Chevron deference was appropriate in Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007), and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243 (2006)).
65 Sternberg v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 299 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir.
2002). My thanks to Emily Hammond for noting this extension of Chevron to new contexts
and the appellate court’s reliance on expertise.
66 See Criddle, supra note 4, at 1274–75 (noting the Supreme Court’s reliance on the
delegation theory in terms of both fact and rhetoric, but arguing that other factors matter
as well).
67 Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 562 (2009) (“[A]
wide range of legal scholars have [sic] characterized the congressional delegation rationale
for Chevron as a fiction.”); Bressman, supra note 26, at 2010 & n.8 (identifying scholars
who have challenged the courts’ inquiry into congressional intent as fraudulent, fictional,
etc.).
68 Beermann, supra note 4, at 842.
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“Congress so rarely discloses (or, perhaps, even has) a view on this
subject as to make a search for legislative intent chimerical and a con-
clusion regarding that intent fraudulent in the mine run of cases.”69
Two of Justice Kagan’s colleagues, Justices Scalia and Breyer, have
conceded that Chevron’s inquiry is fictional,70 and Justice Scalia has
concluded that “[i]n the vast majority of cases . . . Congress . . . didn’t
think about the matter at all.”71 Indeed, since Chevron was decided,
Congress has rarely said anything about interpretive primacy72 and,
until Dodd-Frank, has never (to the best of my knowledge) said any-
thing about the Chevmore doctrines.73
2. Was Chevron Correct as an Original Matter?
If Congress has no intent as to Chevmore, then it is not surprising
that, as Evan Criddle has summarized,74 some scholars argue that
Chevron was incorrect as an original matter. Clark Byse argued that
the Supreme Court “fails to distinguish between statutory ambiguities
on the one hand and legislative delegations of law-interpreting power
to agencies on the other.”75 Tom Merrill has noted that Congress’s use
of express delegations of lawmaking power to agencies in certain con-
texts suggests that Congress does not intend that agencies gain inter-
pretive primacy by default (or, in Chevron’s terminology, by
implication).76 Not only was there “no established background under-
standing that a decision by Congress to confer general rulemaking or
adjudicatory authority on an agency would be deemed a decision to
transfer primary interpretational authority to the agency,”77 but the
69 Barron & Kagan, supra note 25, at 203.
70 See Breyer, supra note 4, at 370 (referring to Chevron’s delegation theory as a “legal
fiction”); Scalia, supra note 4, at 517 (arguing that Chevron’s delegation theory is a fiction
that provides a backdrop for legislative drafting).
71 Scalia, supra note 4, at 517.
72 See infra note 156 (discussing no-deference provisions).
73 See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2640 (“To the extent that anyone mentions the
possibility of greater congressional involvement [in establishing an interpretive regime], it
is quickly dismissed because Congress seldom provides explicit instructions allocating this
sort of policymaking authority.” (footnote omitted)).
74 See Criddle, supra note 4, at 1285–86 (discussing critiques of Chevron’s propriety as
an original matter).
75 Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis
of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 261 (1988) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 466 (1987)).
76 Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
995 (1992) (arguing that the presence of explicit congressional-delegation provisions in
some statutes weakens Chevron’s presumption of implicit delegation in all statutes).
77 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 871.
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APA, which Chevron never mentioned,78 appeared to reveal
Congress’s intent for the courts to retain interpretive primacy over
statutory interpretation. After all, section 706 states that “the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,” and section
558(b) states that agencies may act only “within jurisdiction delegated
to the agency and as authorized by law.”79
3. How Should the Court Glean Congress’s Intent?
Third, given Congress’s prolonged silence and the ongoing disa-
greement over Chevron’s propriety as an original matter, it is unsur-
prising that the Supreme Court and scholars debate how the Court
should go about inferring congressional intent as to interpretive pri-
macy. The Court considers two key factors. Chevron first appeared to
look at only the ambiguities or “gaps” as evidence of congressional
delegations.80 Deciding whether an ambiguity exists became a limited,
textual inquiry.81 But then in United States v. Mead, the Court also
evaluated the procedural formality of the agency action at issue.82 The
Mead Court recognized that “Congress contemplates administrative
action with the effect of law [and thus interpretive primacy for the
agency] when it provides for a relatively formal administrative proce-
dure tending to foster . . . fairness and deliberation.”83 The Court also
78 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“There is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), which it did not even bother to cite.”).
79 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); id. § 558(b) (2012); see Duffy, supra note 24, at 197–98
(quoting § 706 and § 558(b) to argue that the APA confines agency discretion and that
Chevron deference is in conflict with this statutory command); Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 4, at 868 (noting that if Chevron is a common-law rule, this status would seem to
subordinate the Chevron doctrine to the statutory APA command).
80 Bressman, supra note 26, at 2012 (explaining that before Mead, the Court used
statutory ambiguities to impute congressional intent).
81 See Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to
Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 730 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s determination of
whether the statute is ambiguous has turned from a purposive inquiry to one that is
“textually based”); see also Gluck & Bressman, supra note 5, at 994 (“The Court currently
looks only to textual cues for evidence of congressional intent to delegate and considers
the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ in construing such cues. Our study suggests
that Congress often uses extratextual signals as well.”). This limited textual inquiry
suggests that the Skidmore factors may no longer be relevant to step one. See Michael
Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron,
6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 208–09 (1992) (arguing that Skidmore may be superfluous in
Chevron step one because congressional intent is gleaned from the language of the statute
itself).
82 See Beermann, supra note 4, at 825 (“After Mead, the presumption regarding
congressional intent is not valid unless Congress provides an additional indication, such as
authority to issue legislative rules, that it intends to confer lawmaking power on the
agency.”).
83 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
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noted that the “overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking
or formal adjudication.”84 Despite contrary suggestions,85 Mead did
not go so far as to say that Chevron applies to all products of informal
rulemaking or formal adjudication or that no other considerations
were relevant to the judicial inquiry.
The Supreme Court has since offered standard-based and rule-
based approaches to Mead’s inquiry.86 In certain decisions, the Court
appeared to consider various factors or values other than procedural
formality to determine whether Congress had entrusted the interpre-
tation of ambiguous terms to agencies. For instance, the Court in
Barnhart v. Walton (decided only one year after Mead) considered the
Social Security Administration’s interpretation of the duration of
“inability” under the Social Security Act.87 Notwithstanding Justice
Scalia’s contrary view (provided in a concurring opinion),88 the
Court’s opinion by Justice Breyer considered more than the manner in
which the agency acted when determining if Chevron applied. After
stating that the “presence or absence of notice-and-comment
rulemaking [was not] dispositive,”89 the Court considered “the inter-
stitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency,
the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the
complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time”90—factors
similar to Skidmore’s.
More recently, the Supreme Court appears to have suggested a
bright-line, rule-based approach. In considering the FCC’s interpreta-
tion of its regulatory jurisdiction under the Communications Act of
1934, the majority in City of Arlington v. FCC rejected the dissent’s
“view that a general conferral of rulemaking authority does not vali-
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 312 (2007) (“As
cabined by Mead, however, Chevron deference clearly applies to legal interpretations
made in informal rulemakings or formal adjudications.”); William S. Jordan, III, Judicial
Review of Informal Statutory Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two, Not
Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 726 (2002) (“Mead is clear enough in
confirming that interpretations reached through informal rulemaking or formal
adjudication are entitled to Chevron deference.”).
86 See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382–83 (1985)
(discussing difference between rule- and standard-based approaches).
87 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214–15 (2002).
88 See id. at 227 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The SSA’s recently enacted regulations
emerged from notice-and-comment rulemaking and merit deference. No more need be
said.”).
89 Id. at 222.
90 Id.
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date rules for all the matters the agency is charged with adminis-
tering.”91 Instead, “the preconditions to deference under Chevron are
satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with
general authority to administer the Communications Act through
rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”92 The majority
opinion, if it means what it says,93 indicates that an agency’s general
rulemaking power alone evidences Congress’s delegation to the
agency of interpretive primacy for matters over which it may promul-
gate rules, rendering any additional inquiry into agency expertise
unnecessary. Despite its failure to discuss contrary decisions, the
majority’s position appeared to confirm conventional wisdom.94 But
Justice Breyer continued to endorse his standard-based approach
from Barnhart.95 And Chief Justice Roberts, joined in dissent by
Justices Kennedy and Alito, appeared to agree with Justice Breyer
that whether Chevron applies is a matter for which courts must “con-
sider[ ] the language, structure, policy, and legislative history of the
91 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
92 Id.
93 Some may question the Court’s sincerity because two members of the City of
Arlington majority joined the Court’s opinion in Mead. Justice Scalia dissented alone in
Mead, criticizing the Court’s nuanced view of how courts should determine delegation of
interpretive primacy. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 216, 239 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The City of Arlington opinion may be read as significantly
undermining Mead by focusing only on the agency’s rulemaking authority as a
precondition for Chevron deference. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (arguing
that City of Arlington shows how the Court is moving away from both Mead and
Skidmore). Perhaps Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, who joined the Court’s opinion in
Mead, signed onto the Court’s opinion in City of Arlington without intending to signal
Mead’s demise and would be faithful to Mead if the issue were presented directly.
Moreover, the Court accepted only one question for review: “Whether . . . a court should
apply Chevron to . . . an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction.” City of Arlington,
133 S. Ct. at 1867–68 (alteration in original). This question may have suggested that the
Court would assume that any formality requirements under Mead were sufficient for
Chevron deference in the particular case at issue.
94 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 874 (“We know that a decision by Congress
to give an agency authority to promulgate legislative rules implementing a statute is
enough to charge the agency with administration of the statute.”); see also Benjamin &
Rai, supra note 85, at 312 (“As cabined by Mead, however, Chevron deference clearly
applies to legal interpretations made in informal rulemakings or formal adjudications.”);
Jordan, supra note 85, at 726 (“Mead is clear enough in confirming that interpretations
reached through informal rulemaking or formal adjudication are entitled to Chevron
deference.”).
95 See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875–76 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that
determining the boundaries of interpretive authority is not a simple inquiry and requires
consideration of many factors).
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Act,”96 not just whether the agency has general rulemaking
authority.97
Both the rule- and standard-based approaches have their virtues
and vices. The rule-based approach is preferable because it permits
Congress to legislate on a predictable backdrop (by knowing that
Chevron will apply when agencies have general rulemaking power),98
is easier for courts to apply, and keeps the insulated judicial branch
out of the policy-laden decision of deciding to whom Congress has (or
should have) delegated interpretive primacy.99 This rule also may rea-
sonably reflect rational legislators’ intent to delegate to agencies
whose administrative procedures permit congressional monitoring.100
Yet the rule-based approach’s concern for predictability can cause
courts to sacrifice “getting the delegation question right.”101 It is, at
the very least, debatable what Congress intends to signify when
granting an agency general rulemaking authority. Congress may
intend, as some have argued, to demonstrate that the agency has inter-
pretive primacy because the agency can act with the force of law102 or
because Congress can more easily monitor formal agency actions.103
But general rulemaking authority may be less significant—something
that is only “relevant” to the inquiry and fails to resolve it in all
instances.104 For instance, Congress may intend an agency to have the
power to make substantive law—through rulemaking that requires
96 Id. at 1884 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
97 See id. at 1883 (arguing that courts should not look to congressional delegation of
interpretive authority generally but rather consider whether that delegation applies to the
specific statutory ambiguity in question).
98 See Beermann, supra note 4, at 825 (“The greatest problem with the Mead opinion is
that it does not provide any certainty regarding what additional indications are required.”).
99 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241–50 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority’s approach will lead to ossification because it takes matters out
of the hands of the agency); Garrett, supra note 5, at 2644 (noting that Chevron can further
democratic values by giving interpretive primacy to the elected executive branch as
opposed to the judiciary).
100 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 2044 (explaining how administrative procedures rely
on constituents to monitor agencies and call on legislators to intervene prior to agencies’
final actions).
101 Garrett, supra note 5, at 2648.
102 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 836–37 (discussing the relationship between
congressional delegation of the power to interpret and the power to act with the “force of
law”).
103 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing congressional monitoring).
104 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 25, at 219 (“Congress might desire the converse: to
give interpretive authority to an agency separate and apart from the power to issue rules or
orders with independent legal effect on parties.”); Garrett, supra note 5, at 2648 (“Mead’s
safe harbor is not necessarily an accurate proxy for congressional delegation to agencies,
although perhaps it is a tighter fit than the broader Chevron rule because it affects a
smaller subset of agency decisions and considers one factor that is surely relevant to
discovering actual intent.”).
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notice, an opportunity for public participation, and an explanation—
but only with intensive judicial monitoring.105 Indeed, legislative
drafters in a recent survey approved a standard-based approach sim-
ilar to those in Mead and Barnhart that looks beyond formality to,
among other things, the longstanding nature of the agency’s interpre-
tation, the subject matter, and the nature of the particular issue.106 In
short, by relying so heavily on an ambiguous signal from Congress,
courts fail to acknowledge other values and considerations—such as
expertise, the duration of the agency’s position, legislative history, and
context—that may better capture congressional intent.107
Prominent scholars have argued that the Court’s two-part inquiry
into congressional intent supports their contention that the Court’s
inquiry is fictional or fraudulent.108 Some have deemed it “fictional”
because Congress is unlikely to delegate interpretive primacy to agen-
cies based on statutory ambiguity109 or because how an agency acts
does not necessarily relate to delegation of interpretive primacy.110
Some have characterized the inquiry as “fraudulent” because the
Supreme Court does not care about what Congress actually intended
but instead relies on across-the-board presumptions.111 Lisa Schultz
Bressman has responded to these criticisms by arguing that the
inquiry into imputed congressional intent—which considers statutory
text, context, procedural formality, regulatory authority, and legisla-
tive history—is simply the familiar way that courts, under a Legal
Process School Model, divine what a reasonable multimember body
would intend.112 If the more nuanced inquiry of Barnhart controls, she
105 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 25, at 218 (“The power to make binding substantive
law, after all, involves much more than the power to make controlling interpretations of
ambiguous statutory terms . . . .”); see also id. at 218–19 n.64 (noting that before Chevron
the Court had rarely applied the equivalent of Chevron deference to agency
interpretations provided through binding rules or adjudications).
106 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 5, at 992–97 (discussing empirical findings of a
study of legislative drafters’ views on doctrines and assumptions about the delegation of
interpretive authority).
107 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 2043–46 (noting how legislative drafters rely on
different signals and contextual clues to signal delegation); Krotoszynski, supra note 4, at
751 n.72 (“[I]f the true test is congressional intent, a careful search of floor statements and
committee reports seems a more useful source of relevant information than the agency’s
behavior in enforcing a particular statutory provision.”).
108 See supra Part I.B. (summarizing the viewpoints of these scholars).
109 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 2009–10 (presenting critics’ claim that Congress is
more likely to want courts to exercise independent judgment in the face of statutory
ambiguity).
110 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 25, at 218 (noting how delegation and interpretive
authority are not necessarily coterminous issues).
111 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 2009–11 (discussing assertions that Chevron relies
upon a fraudulent inquiry).
112 Id. at 2046–47.
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is likely right.113 But if the Court applies a rule-based approach that
relies on questionable assumptions that eschew typical evidence of
congressional intent, the criticisms gain force.
II
CHEVMORE’S CODIFICATION
As will be discussed in Part III, Dodd-Frank offers insight into
these three lingering questions concerning Chevron’s delegation
theory. But before considering Chevmore codification’s implications,
let us turn to a descriptive account of Chevmore’s codification in
Dodd-Frank to inform both discussions. This Part considers how
Dodd-Frank’s historical context, legislative history, statutory text, and
statutory scheme reveal that Chevmore’s first codification was part of
both a narrow and grand undertaking. From a narrow perspective,
Congress codified Skidmore deference and included what is almost
certainly a Chevron savings clause to govern one particular kind of
decision: the OCC’s preemption of state consumer-protection laws.
The OCC’s preemption decisions were controversial because of
conflict-of-interest and regulatory-capture concerns, both of which
suggested that the OCC’s preemption decisions were not products of
administrative expertise.114 But from a broader perspective, Dodd-
Frank, of course, was a substantial piece of legislation. Among other
things, it created the newest federal independent agency, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and reassigned
consumer-protection authority throughout the administrative state.
From either vantage point, Congress provided clues about its view of
Chevmore.
A. The OCC’s Preemption History
The OCC administers the National Bank Act (NBA) and pro-
vides federal banking charters. The NBA’s purpose is to establish fed-
113 See id. at 2047–48 (“The Court often imputes legislative intent when determining the
meaning of statutory language, relying on statutory text, statutory context, and legislative
history. Functionally, the Court is attributing collective intent to determine the delegation
of interpretative authority in much the same way under Mead/Barnhart and Brown &
Williamson/Gonzales.”).
114 Instead of considering Chevmore’s broader meaning and promise after Dodd-Frank,
I focused in an earlier symposium essay on the narrower issue of the relationship between
agency preemption, Skidmore’s codification in Dodd-Frank, and how Congress can
improve agencies’ agency-preemption expertise with Chevmore codification and other
means. See generally Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise with
Chevmore Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014).
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eral banks that will maintain a national currency.115 To that end, the
OCC has two missions: to promote national banks’ safety and sound-
ness and to prevent national banks from engaging in unfair prac-
tices.116 Largely based on its aggressive preemption of state law before
Dodd-Frank, the OCC was criticized for prioritizing the former mis-
sion over the latter.117
The Supreme Court had provided significant guidance on the
scope of NBA preemption. In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v.
Nelson, the Court held that the NBA preempted a Florida law that
prevented federal banks from selling insurance products because it
“st[ood] as an obstacle” to federal objectives, such as ensuring
national banks’ safety and soundness by denying banks the ability to
sell certain products.118 Later, when preempting certain Michigan
registration and inspection requirements for banks in Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., the Court added that the NBA preempts state
laws that “significantly burden,”119 “interfere with,”120 or “impair[ ] or
impede[ ]”121 the NBA. In light of Barnett Bank, the OCC issued
numerous preemption opinions and interpretive letters.122
115 See Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203 (1897) (construing the purpose of
the National Bank Act).
116 See About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.
occ.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2014) (“Our
goal in supervising banks and federal savings associations is to ensure that they operate in
a safe and sound manner and in compliance with laws requiring fair treatment of their
customers and fair access to credit and financial products.”).
117 See, e.g., Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–12,
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007) (No. 05-1342) (discussing strong
state enforcement and weak OCC enforcement of consumer-protection laws); Amanda
Quester & Kathleen Keest, Looking Ahead After Watters v. Wachovia Bank: Challenges
for Lower Courts, Congress, and the Comptroller of the Currency, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 187, 195–97 (2008) (noting a “thin” record of OCC enforcement action); Nicholas
Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2304 (2004) (“The OCC is manifestly not a consumer protection
agency; it is rather a regulatory body concerned with ensuring the safety and soundness of
the national banking system.”). For its part, the OCC denies that it has ignored consumer
protection in favor of safety and soundness. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and
Privatization of Public Consumer Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on
Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 673 n.50 (2008) (“Comptroller
John Dugan denies that the OCC is concerned only with safety and soundness to the
exclusion of consumer protection.”).
118 Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
119 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 13 (2007).
120 Id. at 12.
121 Id. at 21.
122 See Raymond Natter & Katie Wechsler, Dodd-Frank Act and National Bank
Preemption: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 318–20 (2012)
(identifying preemption concerning banking branches, offices, ATM locations, loan
products, and fees).
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OCC preemption did not attract significant controversy until
years later when critics argued that the OCC had exceeded Barnett
Bank’s preemption standards. In 2003, the OCC preempted many
provisions of the Georgia Fair Lending Act, which sought to prevent
predatory mortgage-lending practices.123 At about the same time, the
OCC promulgated an expansive rule that preempted state laws that
“obstruct, impair or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exer-
cise its Federally authorized powers” in lending, taking deposits, and
other “operations.”124 The OCC proceeded despite certain congres-
sional members’ request for delay.125 The House and the Senate
responded by conducting hearings to determine whether the OCC had
acted contrary to congressional intent.126 Consumer advocates (and
congressional members) argued that, despite the OCC’s suggestion
otherwise,127 the regulation’s preemption formulation—especially
with the “condition” concept—was broader than Barnett Bank.128
These controversies revealed fundamental concerns that the OCC
was a conflicted and captured agency whose preemption activities
were not guided by agency expertise and statutory interpretation.
First, as Congress recognized, the OCC has a conflict of interest in
preempting state law.129 Almost all of the OCC’s funding comes from
123 Id. at 320. Although consumer advocates decried the preemptive effect on similar
predatory-lending laws in twenty-eight other states, id. at 324, the OCC contended that it
had little evidence that national banks were engaged in predatory practices and, at any
rate, many of the same prohibitions existed under federal regulations, id. at 320.
124 Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 553–54
(2012) (internal citations omitted).
125 Id. at 554.
126 Id.
127 See Natter & Wechsler, supra note 122, at 322–23 (describing the OCC’s position
that their regulation was drawn from, and consistent with, applicable Supreme Court
precedents on preemption constructs).
128 See id. at 322 (discussing objections to “condition” language); Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial
Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 936 (2011) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Expansion of State
Authority] (“Notwithstanding the OCC’s claims, its 2004 preemption test is plainly
incompatible with the preemption standard adopted by Congress in Section
5136C(b)(1)(B).”). The House Financial Services Committee had worried that the OCC’s
assertion of exclusive authority over consumer protection would “weaken” its ability to
“carry out its primary mission of ensuring the safety and soundness of the national banking
system . . . .” Views and Estimates of the Comm. on Fin. Servs. on Matters to Be Set Forth in
the Con. Res. on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2005, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print, Feb.
25, 2004) at 15–16 (cited in Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed
the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and
Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 352 (2004) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, The OCC’s Preemption Rules]).
129 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16 (2010) (“At a hearing on the OCC’s preemption rule,
Comptroller Hawke acknowledged, in response to questioning from Senator Sarbanes, that
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fees paid by OCC-chartered entities.130 Former Comptroller John
Hawke, Jr., acknowledged in congressional testimony that the OCC
used preemption to increase its funding by attracting and retaining
chartering entities (from competitors such as the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) and state prudential regulators).131 Second, per-
haps because of the OCC’s need to retain chartered entities, regulated
parties reputedly have captured the OCC and have used it to limit
their liability under various state laws.132 Regulatory capture is prob-
lematic because it undermines expert decisionmaking as the agency
becomes persistently biased in favor of its regulated industry in exe-
cuting its mission.133 The OCC’s conflict of interest and regulatory
capture appeared to lead the OCC to focus on preemption as a “tool
for conducting nationwide business”134 and to ignore the need to gen-
erate and rely upon data. For example, as Catherine Sharkey has
noted, the OCC’s revision to its 2004 Visitorial Powers Rule and
notice of proposed rulemaking contained “no factual findings . . .
explaining why preemption was necessary in the specific case or what
conflicts between state authorities and federal banks justified preemp-
tion.”135 Likewise, the OCC’s focus led it to ignore other values that
are germane to preemption, such as corrective justice, regulatory effi-
ciency,136 and states’ authority, dignity, and policy experimentation.137
one reason Hawke issued the preemption rule was to attract additional charters, which
helps to bolster the budget of the OCC.”).
130 See Quester & Keest, supra note 117, at 200 (“Roughly 97% of the OCC’s operating
budget comes from semi-annual assessments on national banks.”); Wilmarth, The OCC’s
Preemption Rules, supra note 128, at 232 (arguing that the OCC has a conflict of interest in
deciding preemption questions because it relies on fees from nationally chartered banks).
131 See supra note 129 and accompanying text; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xxiii (2011) (“[T]he [OCC] and the [OTS],
caught up in turf wars, preempted state regulators from reining in abuses.”).
132 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 27 n.122 (2011) (summarizing arguments from scholars and amici in Cuomo v.
Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009), that the OCC was dependent on, and
controlled by, chartered banks).
133 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 21–22 (documenting the tendency toward and causes
of agency capture).
134 Sharkey, supra note 124, at 555 (quoting OCC officials).
135 Id. at 581. The OCC had engaged in some factual discussion concerning whether
depository institutions engaged in predatory lending when preempting Georgia’s Fair
Lending Act. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264, 46,271–72 (Aug.
5, 2003).
136 See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 227–28
(2011) (discussing values that are relevant to preemption decisions, including corrective
justice and regulatory efficiency).
137 See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 781–82
(2004) (discussing the significance of these federalism values when agencies consider state-
law preemption).
\\jciprod01\productn\n\nyu\90-1\nyu101.txt unknown Seq: 26 30-MAR-15 11:28
26 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1
Indeed, the OCC failed to engage in any significant discussion of fed-
eralism values when it preempted Georgia’s Fair Lending Act.138
By 2009, the Supreme Court joined Congress’s and consumer
advocates’ apprehension over the OCC’s broad preemption rulings. In
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, the Supreme Court considered the
OCC’s notice-and-comment rule that preempted state visitorial
powers over national banks (e.g., the power to conduct examinations
or inspect corporate or financial books).139 Without referring to the
underlying conflict and capture concerns to which amici had alerted
the Court,140 the Court rejected the rule so far as it applied to state
attorneys general seeking to enforce state laws that were not other-
wise preempted141 because such broad preemption was contrary to
congressional intent.142
B. Congress’s Response in Dodd-Frank
Congress responded to the OCC’s actions in two ways that
inform Chevmore. First, it limited the OCC’s preemption authority
and expressly addressed how courts should defer to the OCC’s rulings.
Second, it created a new independent agency, the CFPB, to oversee
federal regulation of consumer-financial products.
1. The OCC
In Dodd-Frank, Congress established substantive and procedural
guidance for the OCC’s preemption decisions. Congress first abro-
gated what it considered the OCC’s broader preemption standards143
by expressly codifying the narrower Barnett Bank standard for the
138 See Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264.
139 Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 523–24 (2009).
140 See Metzger, supra note 132, at 27 (“Federal agency failure loomed particularly large
in the background of Cuomo, with the OCC repeatedly characterized as an agency
captured by the entities it was charged with regulating . . . . Interestingly, the Court did not
invoke these allegations or . . . expressly criticize the agency’s overall performance as it did
in [a prior preemption decision].”).
141 Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 536 (“When, however, a state attorney general brings suit to
enforce state law against a national bank, he is . . . acting in the role of . . . sovereign-as-
law-enforcer. Such a lawsuit is not an exercise of ‘visitorial powers,’ and thus the
Comptroller erred . . . .”).
142 See id. at 530 (“Channeling state attorneys general into judicial law-enforcement
proceedings (rather than allowing them to exercise ‘visitorial’ oversight) would preserve a
regime of exclusive administrative oversight by the Comptroller while honoring in fact
rather than merely in theory Congress’s decision not to pre-empt substantive state law.”).
143 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175 (2010) (noting that Section 1044 of Dodd-Frank
would “undo[ ] broader standards adopted by rules, orders, and interpretations issued by
the OCC in 2004”); see also 156 CONG. REC. S3870 (May 18, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Christopher Dodd) (discussing how the Carper Amendment would reinstate the standard
under Barnett Bank).
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preemption of state laws that directly regulate consumer-financial
transactions.144 The preemption determination may be made by a
court or “by regulation or order of the Comptroller . . . on a case-by-
case basis.”145 The OCC must limit its inquiry to “a particular State
consumer financial law . . . or the law of any other State with substan-
tively equivalent terms.”146 “[S]ubstantial evidence, made on the
record of the proceeding” must support the regulation or order.147
Every five years after preempting a state consumer-financial law, the
OCC must reconsider, through notice-and-comment proceedings,
whether preemption is still necessary and provide a report to
Congress.148 The OCC must also publish quarterly a list of preemption
determinations, identifying affected activities and practices.149
Despite these unique and detailed preemption provisions in
Dodd-Frank, the most novel agency-preemption provisions are those
that concern judicial review. When reviewing the OCC’s preemption
determinations, courts shall “assess the validity of such determina-
tions, depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration
of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the consis-
tency with other valid determinations made by the agency, and other
factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant to its deci-
sion.”150 These factors, as others have noted,151 correspond almost
verbatim to Skidmore’s.152 A savings clause clarifies that the codified
Skidmore standard for preemption rulings does not “affect the defer-
ence that a court may afford” the OCC’s other interpretations of the
NBA.153 Together, these statutory provisions are, to the best of my
knowledge, the first that expressly instruct or allow courts to defer to
an agency’s statutory interpretations.154
144 12 U.S.C. § 25b(a)(2), (b)(1)(B) (2012).
145 Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B). The rule or order must be made “in accordance with applicable
law,” presumably including the APA. Id. Section 25b(b)(6) provides that “[a]ny regulation,
order, or determination made by the Comptroller of the Currency under paragraph (1)(B)
shall be made by the Comptroller, and shall not be delegable.” Id. § 25b(b)(6).
146 Id. § 25b(b)(3)(A).
147 Id. § 25b(c).
148 Id. § 25b(d)(1)–(2).
149 Id. § 25b(g).
150 Id. § 25b(b)(5)(A). More specifically, Skidmore deference extends to “any
determinations made by the Comptroller regarding preemption of a State law by title 62 of
the Revised Statutes or [12 U.S.C. § 371],” not merely state consumer-financial laws. Id.
(emphasis added).
151 E.g., Natter & Wechsler, supra note 122, at 359; Sharkey, supra note 124, at 581;
Sharpe, supra note 136, at 193.
152 See supra note 3 (quoting Skidmore’s factors).
153 12 U.S.C. § 25b(5)(B).
154 See Levin, supra note 5, at 657 (noting that if proposed revisions to the APA in 1995
that called for judicial deference to agency interpretations had passed, they “would
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Skidmore’s codification was no oversight. The revisions to the
judicial-review provisions were dramatic. The House Financial
Services Committee’s original bill instructed courts to provide no def-
erence for preemption determinations whatsoever.155 Indeed, Dodd-
Frank ultimately included a similar provision that called for no defer-
ence during the D.C. Circuit’s review of certain determinations by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission.156 But the revised bill that the House sent the
Senate codified Skidmore deference for judicial review of OCC-
preemption decisions.157 Like the enacted version of Dodd-Frank,
both versions of the bill also contained a savings clause to preserve
current judicial deference to other OCC determinations.158
The legislative history reveals that Congress understood that cod-
ifying Skidmore would lead to less deference than under Chevron.
The germane Senate Report recognized that the Dodd-Frank provi-
sions reduced judicial deference normally provided under Chevron.
The Report noted that the OCC might receive “Chevron [deference]
when interpreting Federal laws administered by th[e] agency” but not
when making preemption decisions.159 Notably, the Report also sug-
gested that the Senate understood that the savings clause would likely
lead courts to apply Chevron deference to nonpreemption rulings,
despite the clause’s silence on how courts should defer to these mat-
ters.160 The only meaningful floor remarks from the House reveal that
probably have been the first scope of review [provisions] in the history of administrative
law to have expressly required reviewing courts to display any deference to administrators
on issues of law”).
155 See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 5136C(b)(4) (2009) (as introduced in the House of
Representatives) (“A court shall review any claim that a State law is preempted by this Act
as a matter of law and without deference to any agency claim that a state law is preempted
under this Act.”).
156 15 U.S.C. § 8302(c)(3) (2012). Congress had provided a no-deference provision in
1999 for federal preemption of insurance regulation. Id. § 6714(e). But its standard—that
courts should decide the matter “without unequal deference”—is more obscure. Id.
Nonetheless, courts have suggested that this standard precludes application of Skidmore
deference. See Cline v. Hawke, 51 F. App’x 392, 396 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying Skidmore
deference to OCC insurance-preemption decision because it predated enactment of the
“without unequal deference” provision in 15 U.S.C. § 6714(e)).
157 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 5136C(b)(5)(A) (2009) (as passed by the House of
Representatives).
158 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 5136C(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2009) (as passed by the House of
Representatives); H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 5136C(b)(4) (2009) (as introduced in the
House of Representatives).
159 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 176 (2010).
160 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(B) (“[N]othing in this section shall affect the deference
that a court may afford to the Comptroller in making determinations regarding the
meaning or interpretation of [the NBA] or other Federal laws.”).
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the House was aware of the significance of Chevron deference.161 Dis-
senting senators did not dispute the nature of the preemption provi-
sions or the interpretation of them by others. Instead, they criticized
their effect, fearing that the bill would “effectively eliminate[ ] pre-
emption and . . . create significant legal uncertainty.”162
The legislative history also suggests that Congress codified
Skidmore and drafted detailed preemption provisions to mitigate the
OCC’s conflict of interest. The Senate Report refers to its concern
over the OCC’s conflict of interest in preempting state law, former
Comptroller Hawke’s testimony that state-law preemption was a tool
to attract new entities, and preemption’s negative impact on respon-
sible lending practices.163 The House Financial Services Committee,
for its part, had earlier heard testimony from the Iowa Attorney Gen-
eral who had advocated for lesser deference to the OTS and the OCC
because they used preemption as a means of attracting chartered enti-
ties.164 Likewise, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan had testified
before that committee that lenders’ ability to choose their regulators
led them to select those that were most business-friendly.165
The Dodd-Frank provisions themselves suggest that Congress
intended to counter conflict and capture concerns. The procedural
requirements render it more likely that the OCC’s preemption deci-
sions—whether derived from notice-and-comment rulemaking or less
formal means—are products of administrative expertise that rely on
data, not improper considerations. Indeed, Sharkey has called for just
such an approach, which she refers to as the “agency reference
model,” and identified Congress’s treatment of the OCC as an impor-
161 See 155 CONG. REC. E3029 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2009) (Statement of Rep. Melissa
Bean) (“[W]hen a court is reviewing an OCC determination concerning the proper
interpretation of the [NBA] or other Federal law that the OCC is charged with
administering, the court is to apply the traditional deference accorded to an agency, often
referred to as ‘Chevron’ deference.”).
162 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 247 (2010) (minority views of Sens. Shelby, Bennett, Bunning
& Vitter).
163 Id. at 16.
164 See Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 51 (2007) (testimony of Thomas J. Miller, Iowa
Attorney General) (“[T]he OCC and the OTS . . . are competing with the States for bank
charters . . . [and] then [they] put a different hat on and say, okay, we preempt the
States. . . . [B]ecause of the existence of that situation, the deference to those two agencies
should be diminished or indeed eliminated.”).
165 See LARRY KIRSCH & ROBERT N. MAYER, FINANCIAL JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE’S
CAMPAIGN TO STOP LENDER ABUSE 124 (2013) (“Lisa Madigan testified in the House
Financial Services Committee that Illinois’ efforts to stop deceptive lending had been
inhibited by federal preemption policies and by rules that allowed lenders to select their
own regulators . . . .”).
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tant example.166 For instance, Dodd-Frank requires the OCC to
develop a factual record because it must have “substantial evidence”
made “on the record” of the proceeding.167 The use of the APA’s
“substantial evidence” standard is telling because it primarily focuses
on factual findings and their implications, as opposed to discretionary
policy judgments.168 What is more, the OCC must place its substantial
evidence in a record from some kind of administrative proceeding,
indicating that the OCC must provide interested parties an opportu-
nity to respond to the agency’s position and provide comments and
evidence to expand the administrative record. Because the
Comptroller must consider each preemption decision on a case-by-
case basis, the data must relate to the particular effects of the law at
issue. The OCC must then revisit its preemption decisions at least
once every five years and consider their implications quarterly.169
These reevaluations require the agency, after notice and comment, to
determine whether new data or experiences undermine the original
preemption determination. Finally, by codifying Skidmore deference,
Congress incentivizes agencies to develop and rely upon their tech-
nical and administrative expertise when engaging in agency preemp-
tion. After all, courts defer under Skidmore only if the agency
evidences “a body of experience and informed judgment.”170 Without
developing and relying upon expertise, in short, the agency is entitled
to no deference at all. Indeed, after Dodd-Frank, OCC officials have
stated that they are “aware that proffering evidence in support of pre-
emption enhances the likelihood that a court will adopt its preemption
conclusions.”171
2. The CFPB and General Capture Concerns
Aside from addressing the OCC’s preemption in Dodd-Frank,
Congress sought, among other things, to mitigate broader regulatory-
capture concerns by creating the CFPB. To that end, Congress reorga-
nized much of the federal administrative state as it related to con-
166 See Sharkey, supra note 124, at 578, 580–82 (illustrating the discussion of the agency
reference model with an analysis of the revisions to the 2004 OCC Visitorial Powers Rule).
167 Id. at 581 (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1044(a) (2010)).
168 See Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law
Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 253–54, 273–76 (1986) (comparing review of policy
judgments under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard with review of factual findings
under the substantial-evidence standard).
169 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b(d)(1) & (g) (2012).
170 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (referring to the “rulings,
interpretations and opinions” of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, U.S.
Department of Labor).
171 Sharkey, supra note 124, at 582.
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sumer-financial protection. As part of its efforts, Congress revealed its
awareness and acceptance of Chevmore (and Chevron in particular)
by tinkering with several existing federal consumer-protection
statutes.
To address capture and conflict-of-interest concerns, Congress
established the CFPB.172 Although the OCC continues to have a
consumer-protection mission, the CFPB has power to protect con-
sumers generally when the OCC fails to do so (and vice versa).173
Indeed, Rachel Barkow has argued that Congress used several mecha-
nisms to protect the CFPB itself from capture, including protecting
the CFPB director from removal from office, granting the CFPB an
independent source of funding, allowing competing sovereigns and
agencies to enforce consumer-protection law, and providing tools for
the CFPB to gain political support.174 The CFPB, thereby, serves as
one of several backstops to ensure that powerful interest groups do
not stymie consumer protection.175
Congress provided a specific role for the CFPB in the OCC’s pre-
emption decisionmaking. The Comptroller must consult with and con-
sider the views of the CFPB.176 The CFPB’s participation renders it
more likely that the OCC has the input of an agency with a charge
focused on consumers, as opposed to national banks’ safety, that can
provide (or alert consumer-protection advocates to provide) the OCC
with additional germane data to help the OCC make a more informed
preemption decision.177 More cynically, the CFPB’s presence and
ability to alert Congress may also help focus the agency on the admin-
172 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 34, at 72–73 (“Consumer groups wanted a new agency
to protect consumer interests because the existing banking regulators with consumer
protection responsibilities largely had ignored those interests and focused instead on their
duties to ensure the safety and soundness of financial institutions.”); Wilmarth, Expansion
of State Authority, supra note 128, at 951 (“Congress designed CFPB to be especially
resistant to capture by the financial services industry, because members of Congress and
analysts agreed that the industry had exercised excessive influence over bank regulators
during the period leading up to the financial crisis.”).
173 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 76–77 (noting that the CFPB has primary enforcement
responsibility but that other agencies can act if the CFPB declines to bring enforcement
actions).
174 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 72–78 (describing the measures taken to insulate the
CFPB).
175 See id. (discussing how interagency and intersovereign competition can limit
regulatory capture).
176 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(B) (2012).
177 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 52 (“Consultation may bring more experts into the
process and improve decision making by presenting competing viewpoints.”).
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istrative record and thus temper the significant bias and capture con-
cerns that can undermine expert decisionmaking.178
In establishing the CFPB, Congress also reorganized agencies’
regulatory authority under various federal statutory schemes that
implicate consumer finance and, in the process, considered the reor-
ganization’s effects on judicial deference. Congress transferred “con-
sumer financial protection functions” over several statutory schemes,
including the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA), and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), to the
CFPB from other federal agencies.179 Congress gave the CFPB exclu-
sive authority to prescribe rules regarding federal consumer-financial
laws.180 But Congress continued to permit other agencies to enforce
these and other statutes. For instance, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) continues to have the power to enforce the FCRA, and the
CFPB can enforce the FTC’s rules that concern unfair and deceptive
trade practices under the FTCA.181
While establishing federal agencies’ concurrent jurisdiction over
multiple statutory schemes, Congress considered which agencies
would have interpretive primacy. Whether any agency can receive
Chevron deference when more than one agency administers a statute
is a perennial issue in administrative law.182 Congress addressed this
178 See id. at 21–22 (discussing how capture impedes expert decisionmaking); id. at 62
(noting that interagency lobbying can neutralize interest-group influence).
179 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (transferring power from the Federal Reserve Bank Board of
Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Trade
Commission to the CFPB); see also Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan
Bernstein, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the
Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1145–46 (2012) (discussing redistribution
of administrative power in light of the CFPB’s establishment). The Federal Trade
Commission’s implementation powers under the FCRA were transferred by § 1088(a) of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1367, 2086 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 1681s(e)(7)). The Federal Reserve Board’s
enforcement authority over TILA and ECOA were transferred by § 1100A (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) and § 1085 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 1691(c)(a)(9)),
respectively. Id.
180 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(A).
181 Mercedes Kelley Tunstall, How the CFPB and the FTC Interact (Part 1), CFPB
MONITOR (July 7, 2011), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2011/07/07/how-the-cfpb-and-the-
ftc-interact-part-i/.
182 See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 24, at 207–09 (discussing the “multiple agency
exception”); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 849 n.85 (collecting cases indicating the
Supreme Court has not resolved whether Chevron applies when multiple agencies
administer the same statute); see also Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 146–47, 152–53 (1991) (holding that, because of the Secretary of
Labor’s expertise, courts should defer to the Secretary, not OSHRC, when both proffer
reasonable, but conflicting, regulatory interpretations); Abbe Gluck, Tax Subsidies Upheld
on ObamaCare Exchanges—Judge Friedman Finds the ACA “Clear”, BALKINIZATION
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issue several times in Dodd-Frank and provided different instructions.
To do so, it relied upon what I call “sole-authority provisions,” i.e.,
provisions that instruct courts how to treat multiple administering
agencies for purposes of judicial deference. These novel provisions
instruct the courts to treat one or more agencies as having sole
authority to enforce a statute, thereby rendering them eligible for
Chevron deference. For instance, Congress directed courts to defer to
the CFPB’s interpretations concerning federal consumer-financial
protection laws and TILA as if it were the only agency authorized to
“apply, enforce, interpret, or administer the provisions of such Federal
consumer financial law”183 and TILA.184 In contrast, Congress
instructed courts to treat any federal agency that Congress authorized
to “apply, enforce, interpret, or administer the provisions of” the
FCRA or the ECOA as the sole administering agency, meaning that
many agencies are eligible for Chevron deference under these stat-
utes.185 As another example, despite giving both the CFPB and the
Federal Reserve Board the power to administer the Electronic Fund
Transfers Act, Congress clarified that the statutory provisions were
not intended to alter judicial deference as to the provisions of the Act
for which each agency can prescribe regulations.186
III
WHAT CHEVMORE CODIFICATION MEANS
Dodd-Frank’s history, context, Skidmore codification, and other
judicial-deference provisions inform the delegation theory that under-
girds Chevron. First, contrary to some scholars’ views, Dodd-Frank
offers significant evidence that Congress is aware of Chevmore and
considers it when drafting. Second, Dodd-Frank provides some evi-
dence that Congress has acquiesced to Chevmore. Third, Dodd-Frank
suggests that Congress thinks, contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent
declaration, that more than rulemaking authority should be necessary
for Chevron deference.
BLOG (Jan. 15, 2014, 1:48 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/01/tax-subsidies-upheld-on-
obamacare.html (noting the ongoing debate over deference when more than one agency
administers a statutory scheme and discussing the significance of a recent district court’s
conclusion that Congress intended to delegate the implementation of the Affordable Care
Act to both the IRS and HHS).
183 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(B).
184 15 U.S.C. § 1604(h).
185 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(e)(2); id. § 1691b(g).
186 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
§ 1084, 124 Stat. 1367, 2082 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(e)).
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A. Awareness of and Reliance upon Chevmore
Contrary to some scholars’ suggestion that Congress does not
think of Chevmore when it drafts legislation,187 Dodd-Frank reveals
that Congress knew of Chevmore and relied upon it as a background
norm when drafting. Although this conclusion is consistent with
empirical studies of congressional drafters’ views,188 Dodd-Frank is
important because it provides an example of congressional awareness
in enacted legislation. Congress’s awareness of Chevmore is perhaps
most evident through its codification of Skidmore’s factors for judicial
review of OCC-preemption.189 But Congress revealed its awareness in
other ways, too. It instructed courts to apply their normal deference
regimes when reviewing the OCC’s other interpretations of the
NBA.190 Legislative history indicates that Congress expected Chevron
to apply to the OCC’s nonpreemption decisions and that Skidmore’s
codification was intended to alter what Congress understood as the
default deference regime.191 And in creating the CFPB and
reassigning administrative responsibility throughout the federal
administrative state, Congress specifically stated which agencies were
to be treated as having sole administrative authority (and thereby
become eligible for Chevron deference) under various federal stat-
utes, including some that predated Dodd-Frank.192 With these sole-
authority provisions, Congress not only showed its general awareness
of Chevron, but it also revealed its understanding of relatively arcane
triggering conditions for Chevron’s application.
187 See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the scholarly view that Congress has no intent as to
interpretive primacy); see also Bressman, supra note 26, at 2028 (“Writing in response to
Mead, [some scholars] asserted that Congress probably does not think about the delegation
of interpretive authority at all . . . .”).
188 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 5, at 995–96 (noting that congressional staffers
were very familiar with Chevron, which influenced drafting precision); Victoria F. Nourse
& Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 601 (2002) (“[I]ndeed, respondents [staffers for the Senate Judiciary
Committee] volunteered several interpretive principles: the rule of lenity, the avoidance of
constitutional questions, and the Chevron doctrine, for example.”).
189 See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text (noting that the factors to be
considered under Skidmore are almost identical to those codified by Congress in 12 U.S.C.
§ 25(b)(5)(A)).
190 12 U.S.C. § 25b(5)(B).
191 See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text (discussing text included in the
relevant Senate committee report indicating that the standard of review for preemption
decisions should conform to the lesser Skidmore standard, while other types of decisions
should be evaluated under the prevailing Chevron doctrine).
192 See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text (explaining the challenge of
determining interpretive primacy and offering, as an example, statutory language in 12
U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(B) directing courts to treat the CFPB as if it had sole authority to
enforce the Truth in Lending Act).
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Yet, should one assume that Congress drafts with Chevmore as
the background principle “[i]n the vast majority of cases”?193 The
answer depends on when Congress enacted other statutes. Dodd-
Frank does not provide insight on Congress’s state of mind before
2010. And, except as described below, Dodd-Frank does not tell us—
in response to Beermann’s criticism that Congress may not think
about the “particulars of the Chevron doctrine”194—what Congress
thinks about any specific delegation issue in any run-of-the-mill
statute. But the legislative history and sole-authority provisions
demonstrate that Congress now recognizes Chevmore as a legislative
backdrop, and no reason exists to think that Congress would apply
that backdrop only to Dodd-Frank or financial regulation. Nor is
there any good reason to think that Congress forgot about Chevmore
immediately after Dodd-Frank’s enactment. Congress’s knowledge of
Chevron and use as a background drafting principle in Dodd-Frank
weakens the argument that Congress does not think about Chevmore
at all and, ultimately, makes it more difficult to dismiss the delegation
theory out of hand.195
B. Acquiescence to Chevmore
Dodd-Frank suggests that whatever its intent when Skidmore and
Chevron were decided, Congress has accepted Chevmore. First,
Congress codified Skidmore, blessing that doctrine’s four-factor defer-
ence regime in the OCC-preemption context. Second and more
importantly, Congress went out of its way to preserve judicial-
deference regimes for nonpreemption decisions in the savings clause
in 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(B). Indeed, the savings clause applies broadly
to “the meaning and interpretation [of the NBA] or other Federal
laws”196 and does not undermine Chevron’s inference of implied dele-
gations based on ambiguities and gaps. Although the statutory provi-
sions did not tell courts specifically how to defer to agency action,
Dodd-Frank’s legislative history reveals that Congress understood
that Chevron was the default regime and did not intend to alter its
applicability in nonpreemption contexts. Nothing in the legislative his-
tory, including the dissenting statements from the Senate, reveals any
displeasure with the Skidmore or Chevron regimes themselves.
Instead, the dissenting senators would have merely preferred Chevron
193 Scalia, supra note 4, at 517.
194 Beermann, supra note 4, at 842.
195 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 2049 (arguing that delegation critics have felt unduly
“free to disregard the fiction of congressional delegation” because they have not
appreciated how its inquiry is similar to other inquiries into congressional intent).
196 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(B).
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to apply to all of the OCC’s decisions, including preemption deci-
sions.197 Third, when establishing the CFPB, Congress considered
judicial deference in the context of new and existing consumer-protec-
tion laws. By indicating multiple times whether courts should deem
one or more agencies as the only administering agency for purposes of
judicial deference, Congress addressed a condition for Chevron defer-
ence. In doing so, Congress demonstrated that it intended, in each
instance, for at least one agency (and sometimes several) to be eligible
for judicially created Chevron deference. In none of those instances
did it deprive all agencies of Chevron deference. Dodd-Frank’s provi-
sions suggest that Congress generally accepts judicial deference to
agency interpretations, approves of Skidmore’s factors, and uses
Chevron as a background norm when drafting.
This apparent acquiescence is important to the delegation theory.
The delegation theory rests on congressional intent. Because Congress
has remained silent as to its intent for interpretive primacy since
Chevron,198 the theory has rested primarily on inferences from that
silence199 or from political theory.200 Dodd-Frank moves us one step
closer to realizing “actual” congressional intent by relying on infer-
ences from enacted judicial-review provisions and their legislative his-
tory. Although such inferences are not as certain as enacted
legislation, they are the best evidence that courts have. The inferences
here do not address whether Chevron or Skidmore were correct
understandings of congressional intent as an original matter,201 but
they do suggest that judicial deference to agency interpretations
largely corresponds to current congressional intent, even if Congress’s
acceptance comes by acquiescing to what it knows the Court is likely
to do.202 If so, the delegation theory has a stronger theoretical founda-
tion going forward, and, as Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman
have noted, congressional awareness of Chevmore “might be impor-
tant if the Court desires to tweak those doctrines based on communi-
197 See supra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining that the senators opposing
Dodd-Frank believed the lesser Skidmore standard would create legal uncertainty with
respect to preemption decisions).
198 See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 25, at 220 (discussing the “unreliability of
attempting to define Chevron doctrine through a search for congressional intent”).
199 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 870–72 (assessing the theory of Chevron as
“implied congressional intent”).
200 See Bressman, supra note 26, at 2011–12 & n.11 (referencing political scientists’
theories of delegation to agencies).
201 See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing criticism of Chevron as an original matter).
202 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 5, passim (referring to “feedback loops” between
Congress and the courts); id. at 995–96 (noting Chevron presents a partial feedback loop
because of how it affects congressional drafting).
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cation with Congress.”203 Ultimately, congressional acquiescence
suggests that Chevron is not the fiction that some have assumed.204
Congress’s joint use of the APA’s “substantial evidence” standard
and Skidmore provides further, yet limited, support for congressional
acquiescence. A key challenge to Chevmore, and to Chevron in partic-
ular, is that these judicially created doctrines are inconsistent with
either the APA’s call for courts to “decide all relevant questions of
law”205 or prohibition on agencies issuing “substantive rule[s] . . .
except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized
by law.”206 Cass Sunstein and Jack Beermann have argued that judi-
cial interpretive primacy in the APA makes sense because of
Congress’s concerns over agency bias and the powers of what
Congress views as “competing entities.”207 Moreover, scholars have
debated how (if at all) to reconcile the APA’s “substantial evidence”
or “arbitrary and capricious” review with Chevron’s second step
(review of agency interpretations for reasonableness).208 The OCC-
preemption provisions suggest that, despite concern over the relation-
ship between the APA and Chevmore, Congress does not find the pur-
ported tension meaningful. In the same section of Dodd-Frank,
Congress instructed courts to apply one of the Chevmore standards
and one of the APA standards when reviewing the same administra-
tive decision, all without altering judicial-deference regimes (such as
Chevron, as Dodd-Frank’s legislative history indicates). Congress
appears to find Chevmore and the APA judicial-review provisions
complementary because both provide judicial oversight of agency
decisionmaking.
But one shouldn’t read too much into Congress’s use of both
standards of review. Skidmore’s codification likely removes any doubt
over whether Skidmore is consistent with the later-enacted APA
203 Id. at 1012.
204 See supra Part I.B.1 (pointing to critics who view congressional consideration of
Chevron as illusory).
205 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
206 Id. § 558(b); see Bressman, supra note 26, at 2027–28 (discussing scholarly debate
over Chevron’s consistency with the preexisting APA); Duffy, supra note 24, at 197–98
(discussing APA provisions’ consistency with Chevron deference).
207 Beermann, supra note 4, at 799; see Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2090–91 (1990) (“Congress has often believed that the
pressures imposed on administrators lead them to regulate with insufficient vigor.”).
208 See, e.g., Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: Agency Interpretations of
Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 565 n.170 (2007) (presenting
scholarly and judicial debates on the relationship between step two of Chevron and the
APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard); Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process:
Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 325–26
(1996) (arguing Chevron and APA provisions are “analogous” because both evaluate
outcomes).
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because Congress instructed courts to apply Skidmore and the APA’s
standard of review to the same issue. This result is not surprising
because under both the APA and Skidmore, courts retain interpretive
primacy.209 Moreover, Congress’s reference to Chevron and an APA
standard in the same statutory section suggests that Congress also
does not find the tensions between Chevron and the APA meaningful.
But Congress’s actions do not reveal how Chevron and the seemingly
inconsistent APA provisions that call for courts to review issues of law
are concordant.210 And it does not reveal whether Chevron and the
APA standards of review are distinct analyses to be considered indi-
vidually or rather overlapping inquiries (in which, for instance
Chevron’s step-two reasonableness inquiry might simply be arbitrary-
and-capricious review).211 But these limitations do not undermine the
central claim that Congress does not appear troubled by Chevmore’s
perceived inconsistencies with the APA and has generally acquiesced
to the judicially created Chevmore doctrines.
C. More than Formality for Congressional Delegation
Rulemaking does not appear to be the delegation talisman that
some had hoped. The Supreme Court, despite its prior decisions to the
contrary, recently suggested in City of Arlington v. FCC that an
agency’s general rulemaking power is sufficient to establish that
Congress intended the agency to address all ambiguities within the
statute that it administers (including matters concerning the agency’s
jurisdiction) and to justify Chevron deference.212 But Dodd-Frank
undermines this rule—whether City of Arlington intentionally or neg-
ligently suggested such a rule. In Dodd-Frank, Congress divorced
express delegation of authority to make a particular decision (even
through formalized proceedings, such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking) from Chevron deference. In fact, Congress may have
required the most formal agency procedures under the APA—formal
adjudication or rulemaking—for preemption decisions because it
209 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
210 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress, through the APA,
revealed its preference for interpretive primacy to remain with the courts).
211 Judge Harry Edwards argues, for example, that arbitrary-and-capricious review is an
additional inquiry after Chevron’s two steps. Beermann, supra note 4, at 806 & nn.105–06
(citing Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. ICC, 862 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Ron Levin,
on the other hand, views Chevron’s step two as encompassing arbitrary-and-capricious
review. Beermann, supra note 4, at 806–07 & n.107 (citing Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy
of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1276 (1997)).
212 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013); see also Duffy, supra note 24,
at 202 (arguing that Chevron should apply as a corollary of delegated rulemaking power).
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called for proceedings “on the record.”213 It expressly delegated the
preemption question to the OCC214 and bestowed general rulemaking
power upon it.215 Yet, by providing less deferential judicial review
than would otherwise apply, Congress gave courts interpretative pri-
macy.216 Dodd-Frank suggests that delegation to administer a statute
generally or to address a particular regulatory issue, even through
rulemaking or other formal procedures, should not by itself be under-
stood as Congress bestowing interpretive primacy upon agencies.
Dodd-Frank’s context, legislative history, and statutory text all
suggest that Congress delegates interpretive primacy only when the
agency is not captured or subject to meaningful conflicts of interest.
Congress stripped the OCC’s preemption decisions of Chevron defer-
ence after years of questionable rulings during which the banking
industry had captured the agency and the agency conceded its conflict
of interest. The legislative history referred to this troubling behavior
as grounds for the preemption provisions.217 The preemption provi-
sions’ text—through its use of administrative procedures, substantial-
evidence review, and consultation requirements—also reveals that
Congress sought to ensure that agency-preemption decisions are
213 Sections 553 and 554 of the APA require formal proceedings when Congress requires
agency action “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c),
554(a) (2012). Dodd-Frank requires findings “on the record of the proceeding.” Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1044, 124 Stat.
1376, 2104–06 (2010). Because the Supreme Court has strictly interpreted the APA
triggering language for formal proceedings, it is not certain whether Dodd-Frank requires
the OCC to proceed through formal proceedings. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry.,
410 U.S. 224, 238 (1973) (holding that a statutory requirement for action “after hearing”
did not require formal proceedings). But the Court has indicated that “on the record”—the
phrase used in Dodd-Frank—is a sufficient signal to reveal Congress’s intent for formal
proceedings. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Co., 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972)
(“Sections 556 and 557 need be applied only where the agency statute, in addition to
providing a hearing, prescribes explicitly that it be ‘on the record.’” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). I have uncovered no illuminating legislative history.
214 12 U.S.C. § 25b(B)(3)(A) (2012). Section 25b(B) also expressly allows courts, too, to
provide preemption rulings. Id. § 25b(B)(5). Although this provision suggests that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction should not apply to preemption, it is not meaningful to
interpretive primacy because the provision of Skidmore deference necessarily gave the
courts interpretive primacy.
215 Id. § 93a.
216 See Sharpe, supra note 136, at 225 (discussing the meaning of Skidmore’s
codification). The Senate Report demonstrates that the Senate understood that it had
lowered what it perceived to be the normal deference regime. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at
176 (2010) (noting first that “[s]ection 1044 clarifies that nothing affects the deference that
a court may afford to the OCC under the Chevron doctrine when interpreting Federal laws
administered by that agency,” and then describing a less deferential standard for
preemption decisions).
217 See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s grounds for
the relaxed deference standard).
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based on germane factors and expertise, not on improper considera-
tions that derive from capture and conflicts of interest.218 Moreover,
one of Dodd-Frank’s key objectives was to overcome regulatory cap-
ture as to consumer-financial protection generally, as the creation of
the CFPB as an independent agency and the reorganization of federal
administrative powers attest. Thus, Congress denied the OCC inter-
pretive primacy as to preemption matters, despite express delegation
of rulemaking authority to address a specified question, because of
capture-and-conflict concerns that undermined agency expertise.
Yet three related questions emerge. First, should Congress’s
action in Dodd-Frank have meaning for Chevron in other statutory
contexts or merely serve as an express exception to a default rule?
Second, even if Congress’s action in Dodd-Frank has broader signifi-
cance, is the Mead standard likely to honor congressional intent in
more instances than the City of Arlington rule? And third, are courts
competent to inquire into regulatory capture? I conclude, respec-
tively, that Dodd-Frank’s Chevmore codification has broader signifi-
cance; that, despite the difficulty of the issue, Mead is preferable; and
that courts are competent to consider regulatory capture, even if they
are not always more competent than Congress.
1. Dodd-Frank’s Broader Application as to Chevron
The argument that Dodd-Frank’s treatment of rulemaking and
interpretive primacy is nothing more than a fluke is significant.
Congress was focused on a specific type of decision (preemption) by
one particular agency (OCC) after its controversial history as to those
decisions. It did not deprive the OCC of Chevron deference as to
other decisions under the NBA. That Congress only rarely takes sim-
ilar actions (against the SEC, the CFTC, and the OCC) may reveal
that Congress clarifies when it wants to pull agencies away from
Chevron’s comforting arms. In short, the argument is that Dodd-
Frank’s codification of Skidmore merely proves the existence of a gen-
eral rule: that Congress, unless it expressly provides otherwise, wants
Chevron to apply when agencies have rulemaking power.
Despite this reasonable argument, it is better to consider Dodd-
Frank as a window into Congress’s broader conception of when
Chevron should apply (in the absence of an express statement from
Congress). This is so because, even if Dodd-Frank punished a specific
recalcitrant agency, Dodd-Frank provides perhaps the best indication
of why Congress punished this agency by taking away its interpretive
218 See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s imposition of
more stringent preemption procedures on the OCC).
\\jciprod01\productn\n\nyu\90-1\nyu101.txt unknown Seq: 41 30-MAR-15 11:28
April 2015] CODIFYING CHEVMORE 41
primacy. In other words, Dodd-Frank provides our best evidence of
Congress’s “actual” intent as to the propriety of interpretive primacy
and thus is highly relevant to Chevron’s delegation theory. If Chevron
means what it says about the delegation theory (and is not fraudulent,
as some have contended), then courts should “attend carefully to the
signals Congress sends about its interpretive wishes [concerning
Chevron].”219 Even if it is not as clear as a statute of general applica-
tion,220 Dodd-Frank provides Congress’s most pronounced guidance
on when it wants Chevron to apply and therefore should have more
salience than inferences from silence and political theory. Dodd-Frank
reveals that Congress does not intend agencies to receive Chevron
deference when their decisions are unlikely to be products of exper-
tise. This concern for agency expertise makes sense because Congress
turns to agencies precisely because of their expertise.221 The capture-
and-conflict concerns that surrounded the OCC’s preemption deci-
sions are not unique to the OCC or to only a certain category of deci-
sions; instead they apply to the entire federal administrative state and
affect all agencies’ use of expertise. An agency’s consistent use of
agency expertise, in other words, should be a necessary condition for
Chevron deference aside from any inquiry into the procedures by
which the agency acts.
Indeed, presuming that rulemaking authority always reveals
Congress’s intent to bestow interpretive primacy on agencies is incon-
sistent with other observations. For instance, congressional staffers
have indicated that giving agencies rulemaking power is always or
often relevant, though not dispositive, to the question of whether
Congress intended to grant interpretative primacy.222 It is likewise
consistent with Barron and Kagan’s insight that congressional delega-
219 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 836.
220 See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2661–62 (discussing difficulties in drafting judicial-
review statutes of general application).
221 See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 681 (1996) (“Congress’s decision
to commit lawmaking power to agencies vests substantial regulatory authority in
specialized bodies with knowledge, expertise, and experience that generalist courts lack.
Agencies may therefore have insights into regulatory history, context, or purpose that may
not be readily apparent to even the most seasoned federal judge.”); Jonathan R. Siegel,
The REINS Act and the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 131, 174 (2013) (“[O]ne need only recall the reasons why Congress creates
administrative agencies . . . in the first place: Congress lacks the time and expertise to make
every decision itself . . . .”).
222 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 5, at 999 (stating that 88% of respondents
confirmed that providing notice-and-comment rulemaking power is always or often
germane to whether Congress intended an agency to have interpretive power subject to
Chevron deference).
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tion of authority and judicial review are distinct matters.223 And it
makes sense for Congress to give courts interpretive primacy over
decisions tainted by capture. By doing so, Congress can use courts to
monitor agencies and reduce principal-agency costs as agencies
administer a statutory scheme.224 In short, there is little reason to
think that Congress’s concern about capture (and expertise) was or
should be a one-time affair.225
Dodd-Frank’s context and legislative history are important in
uncovering congressional intent. They allow courts to understand
what values and concerns led Congress to deny the OCC interpretive
primacy—namely, the importance of agencies using their expertise
and the significant conflicts that may lead agencies to act without
doing so. These values allow courts to view Dodd-Frank as a manifes-
tation of Congress’s likely intent as to interpretive primacy generally.
In contrast, courts should not draw any broadly applicable inferences
from Congress’s disparate use of sole-authority provisions because the
statutory text, the legislative history, and the context of those revi-
sions provide no guide as to why Congress acted as it did in awarding
interpretive primacy.
To be sure, Dodd-Frank is merely one expression of congres-
sional intent whose broader meaning would benefit from similar
expressions. But for the reasons discussed infra in Part IV.A, awaiting
a statute of general application would likely be in vain. Congress is
unlikely and unable to codify the substance of judicial deference with
specificity. The best expression that Congress can provide of its intent
as to interpretive primacy must come from specific applications. For
223 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 25, at 238 (“That Congress has delegated power to
a named person within an agency does not mean that Congress has instructed courts to
defer to that person’s actions . . . .”); id. at 218 (“The power to make binding substantive
law, after all, involves much more than the power to make controlling interpretations of
ambiguous statutory terms; to deny the agency the latter is in no way to make meaningless
the grant of the former.”); see also Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and
Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 85 (noting that Congress may separate lawmaking
from interpretive power, such as when it intends an agency to have interpretive primacy
despite lacking rulemaking authority).
224 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1187 (2012) (“[W]henever Congress delegates authority to an
agency, the delegation inevitably provides the agency with discretion, which creates a risk
of drift away from the preferences of the lawmakers who enacted the delegation.”).
225 Congress’s unprecedented use of Skidmore deference in Dodd-Frank does not
necessarily reveal Congress’s intent for Chevron to apply in all other instances. Such a
construct would not fit well with Chevron generally. Although Congress’s express
delegations are “rare,” Garrett, supra note 5, at 2642, courts, instead of inferring that
Congress does not delegate in all other circumstances in which it is silent, search for (and
find) implied delegations to which Chevron applies.
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Chevron to be more than a fraudulent exercise that eschews the best
evidence of congressional intent, courts must consider the hints that
Congress gives in specific applications and draw larger inferences
when possible, as with Dodd-Frank. If Congress provides more dia-
logue, as I suggest it should infra in Part IV.B, courts will have better
information from which to glean congressional intent and perhaps
reevaluate Dodd-Frank’s broader meaning.
2. Mead as a Better Default Regime
The much more difficult question is whether selecting Mead or
City of Arlington as a default regime would more often realize
Congress’s intent as to Chevron. I conclude, on balance, that Mead is
preferable. Not only is Mead’s more nuanced approach consistent
with all evidence of congressional intent, but the benefits of City of
Arlington’s rule-based approach are overstated. Although there is a
significant argument that City of Arlington would be a better default
rule if Congress would be more likely to react if the court gets the
delegation question wrong, this result is far from clear.
As a preliminary matter, City of Arlington, despite its rule-based
approach, will not render the matter of interpretative primacy
straightforward. This is because whatever virtue City of Arlington’s
rule has at Chevron’s step zero (i.e., the determination of whether
Chevron should apply at all) is generally lost during Chevron’s latter
two steps (i.e., determining whether the statute is ambiguous and, if
so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable). Justice Scalia,
the Court’s most consistent proponent of rules at step zero, readily
concedes that he just moves his searching textual inquiry to step one
because he is more likely to find the statute clear.226 In some cases, he
and some of his colleagues also consider context, legislative history,
and the nature of the question presented during step one.227 His col-
leagues, too, have also repeatedly turned to such considerations and
legislative history at step two.228 In other words, even if City of
226 See Scalia, supra note 4, at 521 (“One who finds more often (as I do) that the
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists.”); cf.
HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132–33 (2002) (noting that courts should not consider
legislative history if text is unambiguous); Jellum, supra note 81, at 730 (arguing that the
Court’s determination of whether the statute is ambiguous has turned from a purposive
inquiry to one that is “textually based”).
227 See generally FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 141–43,
145–56, 159–60 (2000) (deciding that Congress clearly spoke on the matter at issue after
considering text, legislative history, and significance of issue).
228 See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 402 n.8 (1996) (considering
legislative history at step two).
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Arlington renders it easier to tell when Mead’s concern over how an
agency acts is satisfied, it does not tell us whether an ambiguity exists
for which delegation is inferred or whether an agency’s interpretation
is permissible. A searching inquiry at any of these steps undermines
the values of a clear rule when agencies, courts, and Congress cannot
easily determine when courts will defer to agency action.
Furthermore, because Chevron can apply even when agencies act
informally,229 courts are required to engage in a searching inquiry to
determine whether Congress intends an agency to have interpretive
primacy in those contexts,230 revealing that the rulemaking-authority-
as-interpretive-primacy rule does not resolve when Chevron should
apply in all cases anyway.231 Thus, suggesting that courts look at more
than an agency’s rulemaking authority does not render interpretive
primacy any (or at least much) less certain than it would be otherwise.
The square footage of “Chevron space”232 is still impossible to deter-
mine with certainty.
In fact, some indeterminacy under a standard-based approach
should be expected when trying to identify congressional intent as to
the numerous provisions under the entire U.S. Code. To be sure,
looking beyond an agency’s rulemaking power to its expertise will
likely present determinacy problems, increase judicial-decision
229 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (noting that the
absence of rulemaking authority is not dispositive as to whether Chevron deference should
apply (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,
256–57 (1995))).
230 See, e.g., Durr v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1342, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2011) (providing
extended discussion of whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applied to certain
Department of Veterans Affairs handbooks).
231 See Bressman, supra note 29, at 1445 (discussing difficulties in determining when
agencies will receive Chevron deference for informal agency interpretations); see also
Katsen v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335–36, 1440 n.5
(2011) (citing, over Justice Scalia’s objection, Mead for the proposition that deference may
be proper in the absence of rulemaking authority); White, supra note 223, at 86–87 (noting
that the absence of rulemaking powers does not resolve the question of deference). Justice
Scalia has argued that the formality of agency proceedings should not matter for Chevron
deference. Mead, 533 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that there is no
necessary connection between formality of agency proceeding and the power to resolve
questions of law authoritatively). His rule in City of Arlington that the mere bestowal (but
perhaps not the use) of general rulemaking power opens Chevron’s gates is consistent with
his prior pronouncements. But given that the other eight Justices rejected his position in
Mead, one would expect the rest of the Court to care whether an agency uses its delegated
rulemaking or formal adjudication authority. City of Arlington puts that expectation to the
test. The agency had acted through what the Fifth Circuit held were informal adjudications
(although with additional notice-and-comment opportunities to a declaratory ruling). City
of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 240–41 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
Under Mead, the agency would generally not have received Chevron deference, see Mead,
533 U.S. at 230, because it did not use its rulemaking authority.
232 Strauss, supra note 51, at 1145.
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costs,233 and perhaps sacrifice some uniformity in the courts of
appeals.234 But divining legislative intent is rarely a tidy affair, espe-
cially legislative intent as to disparate administrative interpretations
for the entire federal administrative state.235 If Chevron is a product
of congressional intent, it is hardly surprising that Congress’s intent as
to judicial oversight and agency authority may vary and that
Chevron’s application cannot be reduced to an easy-to-apply rule.
Were it otherwise, the hunt for congressional intent would almost cer-
tainly be fraudulent.
And the indeterminacy fears may be overstated at any rate. In
most instances, rulemaking authority and expertise will go hand-in-
hand because agencies usually have expertise to interpret the statute
or portions of the statute that they administer. Indeed, with the sole-
authority provisions in Dodd-Frank, Congress gave the agency with
rulemaking authority (usually the CFPB, which Congress sought to
render resistant to regulatory capture236) the ability to obtain judicial
deference in each instance.237 This typical relationship between
rulemaking and expertise permits Congress to signal its delegation of
interpretive authority238 and allows courts to monitor for relatively
rare conflict-and-capture concerns that may arise after Congress
bestows rulemaking power. Dodd-Frank points to only limited cir-
cumstances (e.g., significant financial conflicts of interest,239 history of
233 See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2646 (noting that Justice Breyer’s multifaceted view of
Chevron may increase judicial-decision costs).
234 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 861 (referring to the uniformity value of
Chevron).
235 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 25, at 223 (“Congress’s view on deference (were
Congress to consider the matter) likely would hinge on numerous case-specific and agency-
specific variables . . . .”).
236 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 72–78 (discussing how Congress sought to insulate the
CFPB from capture).
237 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(A) (2012) (granting CFPB rulemaking authority
over federal consumer-financial law); 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(B) (instructing courts to treat
the CFPB as the only administering or enforcing agency over consumer-financial law); 15
U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012) (granting CFPB rulemaking authority over most of TILA); 15
U.S.C. § 1604(h) (instructing courts to treat CFPB as the only administering or enforcing
agency of TILA); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(e)(1) (granting CFPB rulemaking authority over most
of FCRA); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(e)(2) (instructing courts to apply deference to an enforcing
agency as if “that agency were the only agency authorized to apply, enforce, interpret, or
administer the provisions of [the] subchapter”).
238 See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2659 (“Without a certain interpretive background,
Congress does not know where to focus its attention.”); see also White, supra note 223, at
83–84 (arguing that rulemaking authority should create a rebuttable presumption that
Congress gave an agency interpretive primacy).
239 See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
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certain questionable rulings,240 and certain “major” questions241) that
suggest that an agency lacks expertise to decide particular matters that
fall within its rulemaking jurisdiction. Because these exceptions
should be few when compared to the multitude of quotidian agency
decisions (and could be better defined though additional congres-
sional action and case-law development), the number of significant
cases would likely be sufficiently small to permit Supreme Court and
congressional oversight. In fact, Mead and Barnhart should calm fears
to the contrary. They expressly left open the possibility that
rulemaking authority does not necessarily indicate interpretive pri-
macy,242 but still the bureaucratic sky did not fall. These decisions sug-
gest that Dodd-Frank’s clarification of congressional intent will not
cause significant disruption.
The last significant argument for City of Arlington’s rule-based
approach is that, with a clear rule as part of the drafting backdrop,
Congress will identify those few instances in which its intent deviates
from the rule and thereby ensure that courts understand its intent in
all situations. In the words of Einer Elhauge, City of Arlington may
provide a “preference-eliciting” statutory default rule.243 A
preference-eliciting default rule is appropriate when Congress’s enact-
able preferences are unclear, there are significant odds that Congress
will correct any judicial-interpretive error, and the interim costs asso-
ciated with the interpretation are acceptable.244 For issues of interpre-
tive primacy and rulemaking, courts could reason as follows:
Congress’s enactable preferences are in equipoise (because Dodd-
Frank could either reveal Congress’s concern for expertise when dele-
gating interpretive primacy or merely provide an exception to City of
240 See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2650–51 (arguing that congressional delegation would
consider, among other things, an agency’s reputation); supra Part II.A (explaining
controversial OCC-preemption rulings).
241 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 5, at 1002 (“Sixty percent of our respondents
agreed . . . that the subject matter of a statute affects whether drafters intend for agencies
to have gap-filling authority . . . .”); id. at 1003 (“More than 60% of our respondents
corroborated [the] assumption [that Congress does not intend to delegate major questions
to an agency].”); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266–67 (2006) (refusing to
apply Chevron doctrine because of the Attorney General’s lack of expertise on medical
ethics); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–61 (2000) (deciding
that Congress clearly spoke on the matter at issue by considering text, legislative history,
and significance of issue).
242 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (noting that “the presence or
absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking” was not dispositive in Mead); United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001) (noting that the lack of notice-and-comment
rulemaking is not dispositive).
243 Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2162, 2165 (2002).
244 Id. at 2166.
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Arlington’s rule in one instance); Congress has already shown through
Dodd-Frank that it can react to what it understands to be the Court’s
general rule that rulemaking power leads to interpretive primacy;
Congress should be able to respond to the other rare exceptions in
future legislation when the Court wrongly attributes interpretive pri-
macy to a rulemaking agency; and the costs of awaiting legislative cor-
rection are not onerous.
Despite the strength of this argument, it should not overcome
Mead’s more accurate encapsulation of congressional intent. First, the
preference-eliciting rule applies when “no one interpretive option
more likely than not matches enactable preferences.”245 But all evi-
dence of which I am aware (including Dodd-Frank and interviews
with legislative drafters246) suggests that rulemaking does not always
evince the bestowal of interpretive primacy. Instead, that evidence is
consistent with the more limited principle from Mead and Barnhart
that rulemaking authority usually bestows interpretive primacy.
Without countervailing evidence to support City of Arlington’s pro-
nouncement, a rule of provocation is misplaced because the interpre-
tive options are not in equipoise.
Second, it is far from clear that Congress will respond more often
to erroneous interpretations under a City of Arlington regime than
under a Mead regime.247 If courts grant a rulemaking agency interpre-
tive primacy despite expertise or capture concerns, Congress may be
unlikely to respond because the groups interested in correcting the
mistake (those not sophisticated or organized enough to overcome
regulatory capture) are unlikely to have what Elhauge calls “privi-
leged access to the legislative agenda.”248 Neither the agency nor the
interests that have captured the agency are likely to challenge the
courts’ bestowal of interpretive primacy, despite their better access to
the legislative agenda than public-focused interest groups.249 But if the
courts determine that a rulemaking agency should not have interpre-
245 Id. at 2038.
246 See supra note 222 and accompanying text (noting that surveys of legislative drafters
indicate that rulemaking power is often relevant to interpretive primacy).
247 Indeed, Congress may not respond at all, as one empirical study concerning
Congress’s response to Supreme Court preemption decisions found. See Note, New
Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional
Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1612 (2007)
(finding that Congress only very rarely overturns the Court’s preemption decisions).
248 Elhauge, supra note 243, at 2166.
249 See KIRSCH & MAYER, supra note 165, at 81 (noting that consumer groups “were
accustomed to being outspent 10 to 1 by their opponents”); Breyer, supra note 4, at 368
(noting that agencies may assist Congress with drafting and revising legislation). Indeed,
Kirsch and Mayer’s monograph, supra, details the extraordinary unity of numerous
consumer, labor, and civil-rights interest groups in championing the CFPB’s creation.
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tive primacy under Mead’s approach, such a rare determination (as
the courts’ current jurisprudence reveals) is likely to be sufficiently
noteworthy to alert Congress to the Court’s possible error and allow
the agency and their interest groups to access the legislative agenda.
Accordingly, City of Arlington as a preference-eliciting rule is
unwarranted.
Thus, Mead is the preferable standard for realizing congressional
intent. Its application does not create a fiction but instead, as demon-
strated by Dodd-Frank and other evidence, reasonably corresponds
with legislative preference. Chevmore’s codification strengthens the
delegation theory and removes any fraudulent patina from Chevron
and its triggering doctrines.
3. Judicial Competence to Consider Capture and Conflicts
Despite Mead’s consistency with congressional intent, one set of
questions remains: Do courts have the institutional competence to
evaluate regulatory capture, at least as compared to Congress? And if
so, just how will courts effectively monitor agencies for regulatory
capture? These questions need more treatment than I can provide
here. But my response, in short, is that courts are competent to make
these determinations (even if that competence can be improved) and
can do so by relying on processes that they have used before.
As past practice reveals, courts can effectively consider capture
and conflicts by relying on third parties. These third parties can alert
courts to significant conflicts between the agency’s regulatory mission
and other influences, such as funding (as with the OCC), personnel, or
industry influence. Although these third parties will most likely be
beneficiaries under a regulatory scheme whose interests diverge from
regulated parties, they may also include certain regulated parties
whose interests diverge from a capturing subgroup,250 or competing
agencies. Indeed, Barkow has noted that competing agencies may pre-
vent capture under proper circumstances,251 and Dodd-Frank itself
250 See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (regarding a
dispute among various regulated parties within the television industry).
251 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 51–53 (discussing various ways in which shared
regulatory space can influence capture and interest-group theory). Congress creates many
forms of shared regulatory space throughout the regulatory state. See Freeman & Rossi,
supra note 224, at 1134–38 (discussing how Congress creates overlapping agency missions
and its normative implications, especially for purposes of judicial review and interagency
coordination).
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allows the CFPB to warn Congress or courts of questionable OCC-
preemption.252
Relying on third parties to identify capture and conflict concerns,
though rare, is hardly unprecedented. Groups have attempted to do
this in amici briefing,253 sometimes successfully.254 If briefing suggests
a significant issue, courts, as the D.C. Circuit has done in a leading
case, can request an agency response.255 For instance, courts can con-
sider whether conflicts of interest are influencing a certain kind of
agency action or learn of ex parte contacts that may be influencing
agency policy sub rosa. The presence of regulatory capture or conflicts
provides a valid reason for casting a skeptical eye over agency action
during judicial review and providing less deference than otherwise
might apply.256 Under standard APA judicial review, courts evaluate
whether the agency’s particular decision is undermined by problem-
atic reasoning or process that very well could, among other things,
arise from regulatory capture or conflicts. Evaluating the presence of
capture or conflict from a broader perspective—as it relates to a cate-
gory of decisions from the agency at issue—allows the courts to take a
broader look at systemic problems within the agency and consider the
agency’s regulatory history within a certain area. Courts can rely on
third-party intervention, as they have in related contexts, to develop
better mechanisms for evaluating conflicts and capture as they relate
to congressional delegation. Like Chevmore, the judicial tools to eval-
uate capture and conflicts need not be static.
252 See Barnett, supra note 114, at 601–02 (noting how the requirement that the OCC
consult with the CFPB over preemption encourages the collection of data for
decisionmaking and allows the CFPB to raise an alarm over questionable decisions).
253 See, e.g., Brief of AARP, supra note 117, at *11 (discussing OCC capture).
254 See Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 54–56 (deeming FCC action arbitrary based
on ex parte contacts during rulemaking, as disclosed by amicus and FCC’s response to
court’s sua sponte order).
255 See id. at 52 (requesting a response from the FCC with respect to the agency’s ex
parte communications with regulated parties).
256 In Home Box Office, Inc., the D.C. Circuit invalidated a rule based on ex parte
communications between industry and agency members. Id. at 54–56. That remedy may
violate the prohibition on courts mandating procedures and protections beyond those
provided in the APA, see Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543–48 (1978) (prohibiting courts from requiring agencies to engage in
more procedures than are required under the APA or an agency’s organic act), because it
prohibited ex parte contacts that the APA otherwise permitted, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012)
(applying the prohibition on ex parte contacts only in formal proceedings). But the judicial
retention of interpretive primacy over statutory interpretation certainly does no violence to
the text of the APA’s § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (stating that courts decide “all relevant
questions of law”), is consistent with congressional intent as to interpretive primacy (if
Dodd-Frank means what I suggest it does), and allows courts to consider the issue in light
of the existing administrative record.
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What is more, the judiciary may be in a better position than
Congress to monitor agency capture. As public-choice theorists recog-
nize, Congress often needs industry campaign donations and thereby
is in danger of becoming captured itself by coordinating minority
groups whose influence can exceed larger, diffuse groups.257 Indeed,
Usha Rodrigues has recently completed a case study of how regulated
firms likely found it easier and more fruitful to influence Congress
(with relatively small contributions) than the SEC over certain disclo-
sure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act, suggesting that
public-choice concerns over interest-group capture of a legislature
may be more pressing than regulatory capture.258 Courts, much more
insulated from interest-group pressure, can have competence in evalu-
ating agency capture that Congress lacks because of its own capture
concerns.
This is not to say that Congress has no competence for consid-
ering capture issues or that, if the conditions are right, Congress is not
more competent than courts to consider capture. Congress, after all,
addressed certain capture concerns in Dodd-Frank in several ways
(such as creating the CFPB,259 abolishing the OTS,260 and limiting the
OCC’s preemption actions261), and it likely has more time, means, and
influence to develop facts that inform the existence and effect of cap-
ture and conflict within a particular agency. But Congress’s compara-
tive advantage under favorable circumstances does not mean that
257 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced
Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 651 (1997) (“The central insight of interest
group analysis is that concentrated interest groups often benefit at the expense of more
widely scattered groups, even if the diffuse group has much more at stake overall.”
(reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY (1997))); see also A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public
Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1877–80 (2006) (arguing that
Congress amended bankruptcy laws because of significant industry campaign
contributions).
258 See Usha Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(G), 15 ILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 24–27) (on file with the New York University Law
Review) (noting that congressional factfinding stands up better on judicial review than
agency factfinding and that interest groups spent very little in the way of campaign
contributions to obtain beneficial legislation); Usha Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption
12–20 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2014-23, 2014),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2486720 (discussing how alterations to certain
securities requirements concerning when companies must file certain disclosures were
more easily obtained from Congress than the SEC, because of its notice-and-comment
proceedings and judicial review).
259 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Congress’s capture concerns when establishing the
CFPB).
260 See infra note 284 (referring to the abolition of OTS).
261 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the OCC’s history of questionable preemption
rulings).
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courts cannot serve an important role in monitoring agencies. More-
over, despite any lingering concerns over proof issues or institutional
competence, significant issues of capture and conflicts will probably
arise only infrequently. For more than ten years, Mead left open the
possibility that rulemaking authority may not always resolve issues of
interpretive primacy without causing a morass of litigation. The rarity
of these issues arising suggests that courts and Congress will have suf-
ficient time to respond and consider how to proceed going forward.
All that said, as with almost everything else about the Chevmore
doctrines, reasonable people will likely disagree about what
Chevmore’s codification in Dodd-Frank means. But the broader point
is that Congress has demonstrated some awareness, acceptance, and
interest in the doctrines, and this demonstrated acceptance of and
interest in Chevmore validates the delegation theory. Any doubts
about Congress’s intent merely indicate that Congress should clarify
when it intends the Chevmore doctrines to apply. It is Congress’s
future use of Chevmore to which I now turn.
IV
WHAT CHEVMORE CODIFICATION PROMISES
Congress should continue to fulfill its obligation under the dele-
gation theory to identify whether and why courts or agencies have
interpretive primacy over particular statutory interpretations. By
doing so, Congress helps legitimize the Chevmore regime, provide
additional certainty as to when Congress delegates interpretive pri-
macy, and augment its own authority. Moreover, if proof issues prove
more troubling than I anticipate, Congress may be in a better position
than courts to decide when agencies should receive interpretive pri-
macy because of its access to experts, ability to collect evidence of
improper decisionmaking on a macro level, and authority to confront
and monitor agency officials with congressional hearings and informal
oversight.262
Dodd-Frank provides pragmatic guidance on how Congress can
communicate its intent and address outstanding administrative-law
issues. By turning to the Chevmore doctrines, Congress can provide a
“Chevron reward” or a “Skidmore penalty” in light of agency
behavior. As in Dodd-Frank, Congress can address lingering questions
about how agencies must act to obtain Chevron or Skidmore defer-
ence, use Chevmore codification to adjust the degree of judicial over-
262 See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2654 (discussing Congress’s institutional and
technocratic advantages over courts in assessing whether to bestow interpretive primacy on
agencies).
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sight over agencies as appropriate, and, relatedly, use Chevmore
codification to address instances of regulatory capture.
A. How to Codify Chevmore
Before considering the benefits of Chevmore codification, I shall
briefly consider how Congress should go about codification. For
instance, although drafting an omnibus statute to govern all matters
concerning judicial review would best reflect Congress’s intent as to
Chevmore, history suggests that Congress should not do so. Instead,
more targeted application of the Chevmore doctrines, as in Dodd-
Frank, will prove more productive.
Congress’s failure to pass a judicial-review statute of general
application since the APA in 1946 suggests that an omnibus statutory
response is unlikely to succeed. In the 1970s and 1980s, the so-called
Bumpers Amendment, named after Senator Dale Bumpers, would
have instructed courts to provide little or no deference to agencies’
statutory interpretations.263 This “deeply controversial” bill failed.264
The Senate tried again in the mid-1990s. This time, it sought to revise
the APA by appearing to codify, among other things, Chevron’s two
steps.265 But this attempt also failed. This failure was likely for the
best because its provisions did not resolve whether Congress intended
to alter the judicially created Chevron standard.266 In considering the
lessons from the failed Senate bill, Ron Levin noted that the
numerous issues surrounding Chevron and judicial review generally
are “abstract, difficult, and constantly evolving” and thus “not the sort
of subject[s] that generalist drafters can easily ‘clarify.’”267 These
issues for Chevron include deciding how broadly one should define
“interpretation” as opposed to discretionary decisions (which may be
reviewed differently), which materials to consult to ascertain congres-
sional intent, how to review an agency determination for reasonable-
ness, and how to balance judicial deference with meaningful judicial
review without sending confusing signals.268 Likewise, as Elizabeth
Garrett has noted, although general judicial-review statutes may
263 See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2670 (noting that the Bumpers Amendment “favored
courts over agencies in all circumstances”); Levin, supra note 5, at 654 (“[The Bumpers
Amendment] would have directed courts to display little or no deference to administrators’
views on legal issues arising during judicial review of any agency action.”).
264 Levin, supra note 5, at 654.
265 Id. at 655 (citing S. 343, 104th Cong. § 706(c) (1995)).
266 See id. at 655–58 (discussing the vagueness of the 1995 Senate bill).
267 Id. at 665.
268 See id. at 659–64 (discussing problems with codifying the still-evolving Chevron
doctrine and other concerns with the language and structure of the proposed amendment).
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suffer less from interest-group influence, they may present unintended
consequences and fail to predict applications of a general rule.269
A more targeted approach may prove more realistic. After noting
the impracticability of revising all federal regulatory statutes to
account for all deference issues,270 Garrett suggests that Congress may
be more successful in codifying judicial review in a more systematic
fashion: by considering law-making authority on an agency-by-agency
basis in periodic reauthorization or appropriations statutes.271 Pro-
ceeding on an agency-by-agency basis, she argues, permits productive
interest-group participation by encouraging the sharing of helpful
information while leaving groups behind a veil of ignorance when
helping to craft the proper amount of deference for a particular
agency.272 Indeed, Dodd-Frank suggests that even less frequent con-
sideration—when rethinking a particular regulatory area (finance),
establishing new agencies (the CFPB), or rearranging agency func-
tions (those of the prudential financial regulators, such as the OCC
and the FDIC)—provides at least some benefits.273
Dodd-Frank provides a striking example of how a more targeted
approach may better clarify congressional intent. As indicated supra
in Part III, Congress generally intends courts to defer to agency inter-
pretations of statutes that the agency administers and approves gener-
ally of Chevron as a background norm for allocating interpretive
primacy over ambiguous regulatory statutes. But Dodd-Frank also
suggests that the courts do not always realize Congress’s intent. By
considering both the particular interpretation that the agency has
made or will make and the overall success of the agency in pursuing its
regulatory mission, Congress can refine the Chevmore doctrines to its
liking and use them in ways that further other values, such as adminis-
trative expertise and independence. This is exactly what Congress did
in Dodd-Frank.
Further limits may also prove helpful. Even with targeted codifi-
cation, Congress will likely prove more successful in identifying when
Chevron or Skidmore should apply, not “clarifying” how the doctrines
269 Garrett, supra note 5, at 2661–62. For a prominent example, see § 706 of the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (setting forth the general standard of review for agency actions).
270 See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2662 (discussing institutional and pragmatic limitations
to any congressional effort to revise each regulatory statute with respect to delegation
decisions).
271 Id. at 2640–41, 2663.
272 Id. at 2664–65.
273 Unlike Garrett, I do not consider procedural details about how or when Congress
should codify Chevmore. But I agree that targeted, systematic consideration of interpretive
primacy issues, accompanied by explanatory legislative history, has been and likely will be
more fruitful.
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should function. Drafting precisely how the Chevmore doctrines
(especially Chevron) should function is difficult and perhaps impos-
sible.274 But by simply identifying which Chevmore doctrine (if any)
should apply, Congress can, as in Dodd-Frank, create an appropriate
mood for judicial review275 and leave courts to develop the Chevmore
doctrines. For instance, by codifying the open-ended fourth Skidmore
factor, which allows courts to consider “other factors” that tend to
persuade,276 courts can continue to look at other variables—such as
the longevity of the agency’s interpretation and the nearness in time
between the agency interpretation and the statute’s enactment—
where relevant.277 Likewise, a Chevron savings clause (with useful leg-
islative history) or other provisions, such as the sole-authority provi-
sions for federal consumer-protection laws, does not require Congress
to define the doctrine’s contours or describe its application in all sce-
narios. These Chevmore provisions allow Congress to signal
Skidmore’s application when Chevron might otherwise apply (as with
the OCC-preemption provisions) and vice versa. Indeed, in a recent
bipartisan effort in the Senate to revise the APA’s judicial-review pro-
visions, Congress followed Dodd-Frank’s lead by instructing courts to
use the Skidmore factors when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of
its own rules (instead of the Chevron-like deference that the courts
normally apply278).279 Ultimately, Dodd-Frank provides not only some
274 See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2661–62 (discussing critiques of comprehensive
deference statutes); Levin, supra note 5, at 665 (cautioning against the codification of
standards of judicial review of agency action).
275 See Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 771, 783 (2002) (noting Mead and other Supreme Court decisions can be understood
as instructing lower courts to apply different moods during judicial review depending upon
whether Skidmore or Chevron applies); Peter M. Shane, City of Arlington v. FCC: Boon to
the Administrative State or Fodder for Law Nerds?, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 17, 2013),
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/city-of-arlington-v-fcc-boon-to-
the-administrative-state-or-fodder-for-law-nerds/ (describing Chevron as a “mood-setting”
device).
276 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012).
277 See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 4, at 1259 (noting factors that appellate courts
have considered as part of Skidmore inquiry). My thanks to Kristin Hickman for this
insight.
278 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (noting that an agency’s interpretation
of its own regulations is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). “In practice, Auer deference
is Chevron deference applied to regulations rather than statutes.” Decker v. Nw. Envtl.
Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279 See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2013, S. 1029, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013), available
at http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/senate-bill/1029 (proposing revisions to 5 U.S.C. § 706
by adding subsection (d): “The weight that a court shall give an interpretation by an agency
of its own rule shall depend on the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, and its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.”).
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evidence of what Congress thinks about the Chevmore doctrines but
also a practical guide on how Congress can signal its intent in the
future.
B. Chevron Rewards and Skidmore Penalties
With practical ways of codifying Chevmore in hand, Congress can
use Chevmore to reward or penalize agencies. The idea is straightfor-
ward and derives from Chevmore’s codification in Dodd-Frank.
Congress, by codifying Chevron, could give a well-performing agency
interpretive primacy when it otherwise would not have such authority.
Consider the following example. Congress, as Rebecca White has
noted, appears to be pleased with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) because it has given the agency
administrative authority over an increasing number of employment-
discrimination statutes.280 But it has not given the EEOC substantive
rulemaking authority under Title VII (which prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, gender, and national origin, among
other things).281 The EEOC has thus relied upon interpretive guide-
lines, which the agency has made subject to notice-and-comment pro-
ceedings since the mid-1970s, to interpret Title VII.282 The Supreme
Court has refused to apply Chevron deference to these interpretive
guidelines.283 Because Congress appears pleased with the EEOC’s use
of its expertise, it could reward the agency by giving the EEOC an
additional power: interpretive primacy over Title VII. On the other
hand, Congress could penalize an agency, as it did with the OCC,
when the agency habitually decides matters without using its exper-
tise, suggesting that the agency has been captured. Congress need not
take the drastic step of completely removing certain substantive
power from an agency or abolishing it.284 Instead, Congress can codify
280 See White, supra note 223, at 66–70 (reviewing the expansion of EEOC
responsibility through various statutes since the late 1970s).
281 See id. at 60–61 (discussing limits on EEOC rulemaking under Title VII). It is not
clear why Congress deprived the EEOC of substantive rulemaking authority. Id.
282 Id. at 98.
283 See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110–11 n.6 (2002),
superseded in part by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(2009) (“[T]he EEOC’s interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron deference.” (citing
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 224, 257 (1991))).
284 Congress has abolished agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, that
have outlived their usefulness. See, e.g., ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88,
§ 101, 109 Stat. 803. Likewise, Congress has abolished agencies that were perceived to have
failed in their regulatory mission by insufficiently overseeing regulated entities. For
instance, Congress abolished the OTS after three of its largest regulated entities—
Washington Mutual, IndyMac, and American International Group (AIG)—failed during
the financial crisis of the early 2000s. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5412 (2012) (transferring OTS
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Skidmore to transfer interpretive primacy from the agency to courts.
Chevmore codification, like appropriations, congressional oversight,
sunset provisions, and confirmation for agency officers, becomes
another tool for congressional oversight of agency action.
In the process of issuing Chevron rewards and Skidmore penal-
ties, Congress can address, in part, longstanding administrative-law
issues. For instance, Congress can help resolve the “Mead puzzle”
(how agencies must act to gain interpretive primacy) at least as to cer-
tain agency actions, help strike the proper balance between hard look
judicial review and administrative “ossification,” and address regula-
tory capture. Indeed, Dodd-Frank, to some extent, served all of these
purposes and provides a model for future legislation.
1. Addressing the Mead Puzzle
In issuing a Chevron reward or Skidmore penalty, Congress will
often resolve how formally an agency must act to receive deference. In
doing so, Congress helps solve the “Mead puzzle” as to certain agen-
cies or agency actions. In Mead, the Supreme Court recognized that
rulemaking and formal adjudicatory authority are “very good indi-
cator[s] of delegation meriting Chevron treatment.”285 But the Court
has applied Chevron deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation
during an informal adjudication,286 and Mead reaffirmed that
Chevron deference may apply to informal actions in certain, unspeci-
fied cases.287 The courts of appeals have followed Mead’s pronounce-
authority to other regulators); Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a
Regulator: The Office of Thrift Supervision’s Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89
N.C. L. REV. 1777, 1794–95 (2011) (quoting Congressman Barney Frank: “We are going to
abolish, I hope, the Office of Thrift Supervision. . . . AIG and some others that were
theoretically regulated by the OTS, that was like being regulated by the meter maid.”
(alteration in original) (citing Brady Dennis, Born in a Previous Crisis, OTS Faces
Extinction, WASH. POST, June 18, 2009, at A15)).
285 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
286 See NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 255,
257–58 (1995) (according an informal adjudication Chevron deference). The Court applied
Chevron deference to the OCC’s statutory interpretation when the agency granted an
application for a bank’s subsidiary to sell annuities. Granting a regulated party permission
is a form of licensing, which the APA identifies as a kind of adjudication. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(6) (2012) (defining order to include licensing); id. § 551(7) (defining adjudication to
include the process of formulating orders); id. § 551(8) (defining licenses to include agency
permission); id. § 551(9) (defining licensing as granting or denying licenses).
287 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 (2002) (“And the fact that the Agency
previously reached its interpretation through means less formal than ‘notice and comment’
rulemaking . . . does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference
otherwise its due.” (internal citation omitted)); Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31 (“[A]s significant
as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure
here does not decide the case.”).
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ment and applied Chevron deference, at times, to policy statements,288
interpretive rules,289 and agency handbooks that an agency has sub-
jected to notice-and-comment procedures.290 But the appellate courts
have not always been consistent.291 The question of whether Chevron
should apply to different agency actions has been a significant subject
of scholarly debate and a catalyst for extensive litigation.292
As Skidmore penalties are likely to do, Dodd-Frank’s Skidmore
codification renders Mead largely irrelevant for OCC-preemption
decisions. No amount of formality can lead to Chevron deference to
the OCC’s agency preemption because Congress has already made
clear that it has not delegated interpretive primacy to the agency.293
On the other hand, Chevron rewards, as in the EEOC hypothetical,
will provide guidance on which specific kinds of agency action are suf-
ficient for Chevron deference and thus better answer lingering Mead
questions. Congress can use the Skidmore factors and, with some
tweaking, the Chevron savings clause in Dodd-Frank to provide pen-
alties and rewards that address administrative formality in other
contexts.294
Suggesting how Congress should go about determining which
kind of informal actions should warrant Chevron deference in other
288 See, e.g., Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 2004)
(concluding that “Chevron deference is due to HUD’s interpretation” of a subsection of
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act in a policy statement).
289 See, e.g., Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(applying Chevron deference to interpretive rules).
290 See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1273
(11th Cir. 2009) (applying Chevron deference to an agency handbook that “was created
following the same administrative procedures that official regulations undergo”).
291 See Bressman, supra note 29, at 1459–60 (noting that the Ninth and Seventh Circuits
disagreed over whether HUD policy statements were entitled to Chevron deference).
292 See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 85, at 732 (discussing Chevron’s application to informal
adjudications); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 851–52 (focusing on Chevron’s
applicability to different types of agency action in five of fourteen unresolved questions
about Chevron’s domain that have arisen in the lower courts).
293 Scholars had previously called for Skidmore to apply to agency-preemption
decisionmaking. The Supreme Court has applied both Chevron and Skidmore. Compare
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (applying Chevron), with Wyeth
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (applying Skidmore).
294 For instance, Congress could use that savings clause, 12 U.S.C. § 25b(5)(B) (2012)
(“[N]othing in this subsection shall affect the deference that a court may afford . . . in
making determinations regarding the meaning or interpretation of title LXII of the
Revised Statutes of the United States or other Federal Laws.”), as a guide to draft
something along the following lines: “[The agency’s] use of [interpretive rules or general
statements of policy, as those terms are used in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)] shall not affect
the deference that a court affords [the agency] in making determinations regarding the
meaning or interpretation of any provisions of this [subchapter].” Likewise, Congress
could use the codified Skidmore factors to indicate its desire for Skidmore weight to apply
when the agency acts through certain formal methods.
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contexts will likely prove more challenging. For example, perhaps
Congress should decide that Chevron deference is appropriate when
the agency has satisfied certain values (such as permitting public par-
ticipation,295 securing regulated parties’ procedural rights,296 or
reflecting the use of administrative expertise297) through its proce-
dures established outside of the APA (whether through another
statute calling for hybrid procedures or through the agency’s own
internal guidelines298). Or Congress may identify certain trusted agen-
cies whose missions warrant interpretive primacy when they use more
informal methods. For example, Congress might think that the
EEOC’s interpretive rulings and policy-guidance documents con-
cerning Title VII should receive Chevron deference because of the
important reliance interests that employers have on the EEOC’s gui-
dance and the EEOC’s expertise gleaned from handling complaints
and bringing enforcement actions under that Title.299 These determi-
nations would be agency-specific but still provide, with legislative his-
tory, insight into congressional intent. My point here is not to resolve
where the most pressing Mead puzzles exist in administrative schemes
or which values should prevail; these issues are beyond the scope of
this Article. Instead, my point is that Congress can use Chevmore cod-
ification to clarify the relationship between agency action and inter-
pretive primacy.
295 See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 566 F.3d at 1273 (providing Chevron
deference to the Fish & Wildlife Service handbook that was subject to notice-and-comment
process); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 885 (arguing that force-of-law criterion
“preserves the right of public participation in the development of administrative
interpretations of statutes”).
296 For instance, Chevron may be appropriate when hybrid adjudicative proceedings—
which require some but not all of the APA’s protections—may provide sufficient
participatory rights to affected parties. See Stephen H. Legomsky, A Research Agenda for
Immigration Law: A Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 227, 234 (1988) (noting that immigration statutes provide “most of the
safeguards afforded by the APA, and administrative practice in recent years has inched
deportation procedure even closer to the APA model”).
297 See Barnett, supra note 114, at 589–95 (defending congressional concern for agency
expertise as part of the interpretive-primacy inquiry); Krotoszynski, supra note 4, at 754
(arguing that judicial deference is properly justified by agency expertise).
298 See White, supra note 223, at 103 (noting since the mid-1970s the EEOC has issued
interpretive guidelines “only after following notice and comment procedures and
sometimes after public hearings”).
299 Cf. id. at 57–58 (arguing that Congress implicitly delegated interpretive primacy to
the EEOC when interpreting Title VII, despite the EEOC’s lack of substantive rulemaking
power); id. at 61 (noting the immunity that employers received for “good faith . . .
reliance” on the EEOC’s opinions concerning Title VII (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
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2. Balancing “Hard Look” Review and Ossification
Codified Chevmore doctrines can also help Congress oversee the
intensity of judicial review generally by setting the appropriate
“mood.” Scholars have long considered how intently courts should
review agency action under the APA’s judicial-review provisions300
and under the Chevmore doctrines.301 This debate over the intensity
of judicial review, in addition to considering Chevmore, has primarily
concerned the propriety of hard look review under the APA and
whether it leads to undue ossification of agency regulation.302 Yet, as
with the Chevmore doctrines generally, Congress has not sought to
clarify the intensity of judicial review.303 Its silence has generally
seemed wise because of the difficulty, as described below, in clarifying
just how courts should go about reviewing agency decisions for rea-
sonableness. Chevmore codification, however, may provide the key
for allowing Congress to set different moods for judicial review in spe-
cific situations.
Searching reasonableness review, generally referred to as hard
look review, has benefits and drawbacks. Hard look review is short-
hand for more assertive judicial review (in response to growing suspi-
cion over regulatory capture and the limits of agency expertise) than
the APA likely envisioned.304 At its core, the doctrine requires “agen-
300 See, e.g., Meazell, supra note 32, at 741–42 (describing the Supreme Court’s different
signals as to how intense APA reasonableness review should be).
301 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 95–96,
128–29 (1994) (suggesting that courts “substitute something akin to ‘hard look’ review for
the deferential reasonableness standard . . . in Chevron’s step two,” instead of their more
superficial review).
302 Although some may contend that Chevmore applies to statutory interpretation,
while the APA standards and hard look review apply to policy judgments or factual
findings, see Jan S. Oster, The Scope of Judicial Review in the German and U.S.
Administrative Legal System, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1267, 1285 (2008) (“Chevron is applicable to
the legal interpretation of a statute, whereas the arbitrary and capricious test is relevant for
agency’s [sic] policy judgment.”), any purported difference between the two kinds of
actions is often indeterminate, meaning that Chevmore’s bounds are porous and permit the
codified doctrines to provide broader signaling, see Beermann, supra note 4, at 783 (“It is
still not clear whether Chevron concerns review of statutory interpretation or review of
policy decisions.”); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Discretion,
in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 177, 180 (John
F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (“Chevron step two directs courts to defer to
‘reasonable’ agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions. Such
‘interpretations’ constitute policy decisions of the sort to which the arbitrary and capricious
test also applies.”).
303 See Strauss, supra note 51, at 1149 n.23 (mentioning that “Congress has shown no
sign of repudiating” hard look review).
304 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to
Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 906 n.32 (2007) (noting that the
Supreme Court in 1935 said “that a rule issued by an agency is arbitrary and capricious
\\jciprod01\productn\n\nyu\90-1\nyu101.txt unknown Seq: 60 30-MAR-15 11:28
60 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1
cies [to] fully explain their actions, taking into account all relevant
factors, and responding to all material comments.”305 The benefit of
hard look review is that intensive judicial monitoring should lead
agencies to provide reasoned, careful decisionmaking.306 But there is a
downside. If hard look review leads courts to give undue attention to
minor issues, agency action may become unnecessarily delayed
because either judicial proceedings delay regulatory action or agen-
cies, out of an abundance of caution, compile an overly thorough
administrative record.307 With heightened review, the argument goes,
regulation will ossify because agencies will regulate less frequently
and thereby become less responsive to changing circumstances.308
Scholars debate the existence and extent of ossification,309 the benefits
of searching judicial review,310 and even whether courts still (or at
least consistently) engage in hard look review.311
One need not resolve these debates to appreciate that certain
agency actions call for more searching review than others. By intensi-
fying judicial review, Congress can attempt to invest the resources
required for in-depth judicial review (and thus agency monitoring312)
where Congress views them as most needed. Indeed, Congress used
only if no ‘state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it’” (citing Pac.
States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935))).
305 Jordan, supra note 30, at 397.
306 See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 761–62 (2006) (“Defenders of hard look review . . . argue
that it ensures the supposedly expert agency really has based its decision on a reasoned
analysis of relevant information . . . [because it] correct[s] specific decisionmaking biases to
which agencies are thought to be vulnerable . . . [and] encourages agencies to engage in a
superior . . . decisionmaking process.” (footnotes omitted)).
307 See Seidenfeld, supra note 31, at 484–85 (observing that courts may “demand
exacting explanations for agency action,” which creates “great uncertainty” for agencies
and causes agencies to “perform detailed analyses even of [peripheral] matters”).
308 See id. at 486–87 (arguing that increased burdens on agencies deter rulemaking); see
also Jordan, supra note 30, at 395 (discussing arguments that ossification leads agencies to
ignore their regulatory missions and engage in excessive data-gathering).
309 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1111, 1131 (noting that additional empirical work on ossification would “provide
still further avenues for assessing claims that judicial review hampers agency rulemaking”);
Jordan, supra note 30, at 401–04 (concluding, based on empirical evidence, that ossification
is not a significant problem).
310 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1782–83 (2007) (connecting hard look review to congressional
oversight of agency action); Jordan, supra note 30, at 401–04 (describing the costs and
benefits that scholars have argued arise from searching judicial review).
311 See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1468–69 (2012) (discussing views that hard look review has softened
over time).
312 See Bressman, supra note 310, at 1782–83 (discussing how judicial review of agency
action serves to assist Congress in monitoring agencies).
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Chevmore codification in Dodd-Frank for this purpose. There,
Congress instructed courts to perform a searching inquiry into certain
OCC-preemption decisions because of their controversial history and
significant federalism implications. To signal its intent, it called for
Skidmore deference, the APA’s slightly more intrusive “substantial
evidence” standard, a record after an agency proceeding, and reevalu-
ation every five years after preempting state law.
Conversely, Congress can attempt to prevent ossification by con-
stricting judicial review for purely discretionary decisions, agency
actions that are highly likely to be products of proper agency decision-
making, or regulatory issues that are more likely to face regular and
significant changing conditions. For instance, less searching inquiry
(so-called “soft glance” review313) may be appropriate for certain sen-
sitive areas, such as emergency actions and matters, like immigration,
for which the Executive Branch has traditionally received broad dis-
cretion.314 Likewise, soft glances may be appropriate for numerous
agency determinations that are policy decisions, made without scien-
tific or technical certainty, but still informed by agency expertise. The
purpose here is not to resolve when hard look review is most needed,
but to suggest that Congress should continue to consider, as it did in
Dodd-Frank, when different levels of deference may be appropriate to
different decisions.
Once Congress decides where hard looks and soft glances may be
most appropriate, it probably cannot define the review that it seeks
without facing unpalatable phrasing or interpretive difficulties. For
instance, would Congress really want to say that agency decisions
must be “really reasonable,” “marginally reasonable,” or “minimally
reasonable”? And at any rate, would courts have any better under-
standing of these terms than they do of the APA’s “arbitrary,” “capri-
cious,” or “unsupported by substantial evidence” standards?315 After
all, the “soft glance” sound of arbitrary-and-capricious review has, at
times, morphed into a “hard look,”316 and courts and commenters
continue to debate whether the APA’s “substantial evidence” stan-
313 E.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture,
59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1409 (2010) (mentioning soft glance review).
314 See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of
Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1836 n.144 (2010) (noting
reluctance to apply hard look review to immigration-related decisions because of
longstanding judicial deference to the political branches on such matters).
315 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
316 See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1299–1300 (2012) (discussing the evolution of the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard).
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dard is meaningfully different than its “arbitrary and capricious”
review.317
Instead of trying to define judicial review, Congress should limit
itself to setting what it deems the appropriate judicial mood.318 The
two APA standards’ evolved equivalence suggests that Congress
cannot create different moods by specifying one of the APA standards
alone. But as other scholars have noticed, the Chevmore doctrines
may be able to play a supporting role here.319 Dodd-Frank suggests
that Congress, not just courts, can use them. Congress signaled its
intent for searching review of OCC-preemption decisions in Dodd-
Frank with several statutory provisions: the APA’s potentially more
demanding “substantial evidence” standard, Skidmore’s less deferen-
tial inquiry, and record and proceeding requirements. Commentators
have easily understood the mood that Congress set for judicial review
of OCC-preemption decisions.320 Congress, in contrast, used savings
clauses to suggest more deferential judicial review, and Congress
could have clarified its intent by providing the potentially more
317 See, e.g., id. at 1300 n.26 (noting that the arbitrary-and-capricious standard was
originally intended to be a less searching form of review but that the two APA standards
have become interchangeable); see also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[I]n their
application to the requirement of factual support the substantial evidence test and the
arbitrary or capricious test are one and the same.”); Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and
Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2011) (noting that the
Court has not parsed out the meaning of “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or “abuse of
discretion”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 764 (2008) (suggesting that no meaningful difference exists
between arbitrary-and-capricious review and substantial-evidence review).
318 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (“Congress [in
amending the provisions governing judicial review of NLRB decisions] expressed a
mood. . . . As legislation that mood must be respected, even though it can only serve as a
standard for judgment . . . .”); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 557–58 (1997)
(“Congress could make it clear that it expects courts to be especially deferential to agency
choices of analytical methodologies and to the agency choices of assumptions and
inferences.”).
319 See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 4, at 1249 (“Other evaluative standards such as
hard look review, as well as Skidmore’s emphasis on factors such as thoroughness and
consistency, allow the courts to guard against arbitrariness while simultaneously deferring
to administrative interpretations.”); Pierce, supra note 33, at 72–73 (arguing that Chevron
can tame, but not cure, ossification). Others have noted that Chevron itself sets a mood for
judicial review. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the
Preferred Scope of Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 296, 322 n.114 (1993) (“The
importance of Chevron is then in the mood or attitude it conveys to reviewing
courts . . . .”).
320 See, e.g., Richard P. Hackett & Frank H. Bishop, Jr., Summary of the Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 295, 304 n.104 (2010)
(“Dodd-Frank calls for substantially more involvement in judicial review than is
traditionally afforded under Chevron deference.”).
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lenient arbitrary-and-capricious review as well. As discussed above,
Congress can also signal its intent for Chevron to apply without cer-
tain formal administrative action, and thereby counter ossification
that may arise if agencies, in light of Mead, engage in more resource-
intensive formats to obtain Chevron deference.321 By using Chevmore
and other review doctrines, Congress can target those agencies or
actions that it thinks need either more oversight or flexibility. Doing
so will not generally resolve concerns over the appropriate boundaries
of agency discretion and ossification altogether,322 but it can allow
Congress to address what it views as significant issues.
To be sure, determining where searching judicial review is most
appropriate is a difficult task and warrants much more consideration.
The broader point is that Congress can assume a role in addressing
purported ossification and sufficient judicial oversight. Although often
deemed a contributor to ossification,323 Congress is less frequently
mentioned as a problem solver for it.324 Dodd-Frank, however, reveals
how Chevmore codification—whether through codifying Skidmore’s
factors or using deference savings clauses—can help Congress estab-
lish moods to guide appropriate judicial review. While codifying
Chevmore does not directly address how courts should review agency
decisions that do not implicate ambiguous statutory provisions (such
as numerous agency adjudications that apply fact to relatively settled
law, including routine Social Security or immigration decisions),
Chevmore codification may be Congress’s best tool for creating a per-
meating mood to influence the stringency of judicial review outside
the statutory-interpretation context.
321 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 25, at 231 (“Mead inevitably will channel additional
agency action into [an] already over-burdened administrative mechanism, as agencies
sometimes adopt notice-and-comment procedures for no other reason than to gain
Chevron deference.”).
322 See Pierce, supra note 33, at 72–73 (arguing Chevron can tame, but not cure,
ossification).
323 See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 311, at 1417–18 (“Th[e] ‘ossification thesis’
proceeds from the observation that . . . each of the three branches has sought to impose its
own conception of good regulation (or of good regulatory process) on the federal
bureaucracy . . . .”).
324 See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 32, at 1453 (considering judicial modification to hard
look review); Seidenfeld, supra note 31, at 503–23 (suggesting changes to hard look review
to reduce the uncertainty that likely leads to ossification). But see Danielle Keats Citron &
David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil
Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 263 (2013) (noting Congress’s role in mitigating
ossification after 9/11).
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3. Addressing Agency Capture
Setting the mood also helps address the related issue of regula-
tory capture. Indeed, Dodd-Frank codified Skidmore for just this pur-
pose. Although the definition of regulatory capture is hardly precise,
one leading scholar defines it “as occurring when agencies consistently
adopt regulatory policies favored by regulated entities.”325 Because
regulated parties will usually call for less or no regulation that would
inure to the public’s benefit,326 captured agencies make decisions
without using their expertise and fail in their regulatory mission to act
in the public interest.327 Congress can attempt to mitigate regulatory
capture in several ways,328 including by increasing the level of judicial
scrutiny over agency decisions.
Having various actors involved in administering a statute is one
way of seeking to insulate agencies from capture. Barkow has noted
how regulatory and enforcement pluralism can help prevent cap-
ture.329 She argued that Congress’s empowering of other federal agen-
cies or the states to administer or enforce another (primary) agency’s
statutory scheme can make it harder for regulated parties to block
regulation and enforcement.330 For instance, states can have the
power to regulate by passing laws that are more stringent than federal
regulations, and multiple agencies can have enforcement power to
render it more difficult (if not impossible) for regulated parties to cap-
ture a particular regulatory agenda. Aside from states and federal
agencies, the judiciary, with Skidmore deference in hand, can be
another actor that helps mitigate regulatory capture. Interpretive pri-
macy requires courts to defer to agency action only to the extent that
it is founded on agency expertise331 and thereby limits products of
agency capture.
325 Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 224 (2012).
326 See id. at 224–25 (“[I]t is a safe bet that the goal of the regulatory industry is to
minimize the degree of stringency of regulations, if not avoid regulation altogether.”).
327 See id. at 251 (noting that civil servants are more likely to be captured when they
must turn to industry for information and expertise).
328 See generally Barkow, supra note 34, at 42–64 (describing five “equalizing factors”
that can help insulate agencies from regulatory capture).
329 See id. at 49–58 (describing the interrelated roles of various agencies, as well as the
federal-state relationship, and how these factors can aid or hinder an agency’s insolation
goals).
330 See id. at 55 (“[T]his structure puts more cops on the beat to ensure that an agency’s
rules or a statute’s requirements are taken seriously.”). But cf. id. at 56 (“[E]nforcement
overlap can have potential costs in terms of the zeal of the insulated agency’s enforcement
agenda.”).
331 See supra Part I.A (discussing Skidmore’s foundation on agency expertise).
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Dodd-Frank reveals how Congress can use Chevmore to address
capture. First, Congress can use a Skidmore penalty to transfer inter-
pretive primacy from an administering agency to courts when
Congress is concerned about regulatory capture. Congress did just this
with the OCC and preemption. Second, Congress can use Chevron
codification to give an insulated agency space to regulate. For
instance, after using various mechanisms to insulate the CFPB from
regulatory capture,332 Congress indicated that courts should apply the
Chevron regime to the CFPB’s regulatory actions (notwithstanding
other agencies’ enforcement or administrative roles).333 This Chevron
reward gave the agency that Congress has designed to be impervious
to capture more space to regulate with less judicial interference. But it
does more than establish the relationship between the courts and the
reviewed agency. When more than one agency administers a statutory
scheme, providing an agency a Chevron reward can also establish the
relationship between the competing administering agencies. In certain
instances, Congress gave the CFPB—which may be one of the most
insulated agencies ever created—interpretive primacy to the detri-
ment of other agencies that administer federal consumer-protection
laws.334 In this way, Congress rewarded the agency that is perhaps the
least likely in federal history to become captured.335 Chevmore codifi-
cation is certainly no panacea, but it serves as an additional legislative
tool for mitigating regulatory capture.
C. Possible Objections to Chevmore’s Codification
I conclude by rejecting three possible objections to Chevmore’s
codification: codification presents separation-of-powers problems, the
applicable deference regime is unlikely to affect judicial outcomes,
and Chevmore codification may exacerbate regulatory capture.
332 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 72–78 (considering the CFPB as a case study on how
Congress can insulate agencies from regulatory capture).
333 See notes 183–85 and accompanying text (detailing steps taken by Congress to
insulate the CFPB).
334 How Congress’s provision of shared administrative interpretive authority will work
out is far from clear—whether as to regulatory capture, judicial review, or even regulatory
coherence.
335 To be sure, Congress must consider how to weigh the extent of agency capture in
competing agencies, its trust in the judiciary, and whether current political pressures
(whether from the Executive or Legislative Branches) should play a role in agency
regulation. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 2655 (“Yet, it might be the case that, in some
circumstances, the enacting Congress will prefer that policymaking through interpretation
be more insulated from current political pressures than is possible in the agency
environment, even in an independent agency that is somewhat separate from the
President.”).
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First. Whatever separation-of-powers problems exist in Congress
overseeing judicial review, those concerns are misplaced here. Some
have suggested that Chevron may be required under the
Constitution’s separation-of-powers principles, thereby limiting
Congress’s ability to intensify judicial review to the detriment of the
Executive Branch (through, for example, Skidmore review).336 On the
flip side, others have suggested that Congress may be limited in its
efforts to diminish judicial review, thereby limiting Congress’s ability
to codify Chevron.337 Tom Merrill and Kristin Hickman have persua-
sively argued that Chevron is not founded on constitutional require-
ments,338 and I shall not restate their arguments here. More
importantly, once one accepts that Chevron is founded on a delega-
tion theory,339 Congress necessarily has the power to decide whether
it seeks to delegate interpretive primacy upon courts or agencies by
providing Chevron deference. The same is true for Skidmore defer-
ence because it also relies on notions of congressional delegation.340
Moreover, because Congress generally has the greater power to pre-
clude judicial review of administrative action (at least for public-rights
cases341),342 it should have the lesser power of establishing the inten-
sity of judicial review that it grants, especially when it chooses
between standards that the courts themselves created and routinely
use.
Second. Chevmore codification can also provide meaningful gui-
dance, despite some empirical studies’ suggestion that the standard of
judicial review does not significantly impact whether the agency
prevails in court. Although courts affirm agency interpretations more
frequently under Chevron than Skidmore, the ranges of affirmance
rates from various studies, to be sure, overlap. For instance, Richard
Pierce summarized several studies by noting that courts affirmed
336 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 864–67 (discussing the possibility of the
Constitution serving as a legal foundation for the Chevron doctrine).
337 Cf. Richard W. Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control over the “Hard-Look”, 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2004) (“Arguably, it is implicit in the courts’ core function of
blocking arbitrary executive action that they, not Congress, must decide for themselves
what minimum amount of effort their rationality review should require.”).
338 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 865–67.
339 See supra Part I.B (stating the argument that Chevron is founded on a theory of
delegation).
340 See supra Part I.A (concluding that Skidmore deference is also founded upon
congressional intent).
341 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (distinguishing between public and
private rights when determining which kind of cases Congress can remove from Article III
courts’ cognizance).
342 See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (precluding review of agency action when “(1) statutes
preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law”).
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agency action under Chevron from 60% to 81.3% of the time, while
they affirmed under Skidmore from 55.1% to 73.5% of the time.343 He
concluded that the difference in affirmance rates is “barely detect-
able.”344 If this is true, so-called Skidmore penalties and Chevron
rewards lose some force.
One must, however, be careful when comparing the various find-
ings. One of the studies, for example, indicated a lower affirmance
rate for Chevron than other studies, but it limited its inquiry to only
two agencies whose actions are “politically contentious.”345 Likewise,
a study that found a lower rate of affirmance under Skidmore is likely
more probative than prior studies (that tended to show a greater
affirmance rate) because it was the only one that considered how
courts of appeals have applied Skidmore since Mead reestablished
Skidmore’s viability after Chevron in 2001.346 Moreover, one of the
included studies, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer’s empirical
assessment of deference regimes in the Supreme Court, is by its own
terms of limited utility in determining whether the Chevmore doc-
trines lead to meaningfully different outcomes in federal courts.347
Eskridge and Baer found that agencies enjoyed a win rate that was
only approximately 3% higher under Chevron than Skidmore in the
Supreme Court.348 Not only did their study confine itself to Supreme
Court decisions, but one of their key findings was that the Supreme
Court applied Chevron in only about one-quarter of the cases in
which it appeared applicable under Mead,349 and that the high agency-
win rates were likely attributable to selection bias.350 All of this is not
to say that empirical studies are not useful or should be ignored.
Instead, the point is that one must be careful before concluding that
the Chevmore doctrines do not affect outcomes during judicial review.
343 Pierce, supra note 4, at 85.
344 Id.
345 See id. at 84 (referring to the study by Miles and Sunstein that found a 64%
affirmance rate under Chevron from 1996 to 2006); accord Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 848 (2006) (noting their study focuses on “two important agencies
known for producing politically contentious decisions: the EPA and the NLRB”).
346 Hickman & Krueger, supra note 4 at 1235, 1275.
347 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1125 (2008).
348 Id. at 1142.
349 Id. at 1124–25.
350 See id. at 1122 (concerning high agency-win rates after Chevron); id. at 1143
(concerning high agency win rates in consultative deference cases, which are similar to
Skidmore review).
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But even if the outcomes have been similar under both regimes,
future signaling from Congress may lead to a greater disparity
between Chevron and Skidmore review. This is because Congress,
whose intent the courts seek to glean, has suggested that the standards
should be different in application and effect. For instance, Congress
had three competing OCC-preemption bills, each with a different kind
of judicial-review standard (no deference, Skidmore, and Chevron),
and dissenting votes on the basis of Skidmore’s codification. These
judicial-review debates strongly suggest that Congress thought that
the standard of judicial review does or should matter; otherwise, the
competing bills and dissent were much ado about nothing. Moreover,
a recent Senate bill seeking to replace the Chevron-like Auer defer-
ence with Skidmore-like deference for judicial review of agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations highlights that Congress views
the standards as meaningfully different and likely expects different
outcomes.351
And even if the ranges remain similar going forward, such a
result does not mean that agencies act the same no matter which
regime applies. Instead, it could merely reveal that agencies are
responding to Congress’s concerns and providing better evidence of
their expertise when Skidmore applies and otherwise limiting the
aggressiveness of their interpretations. Indeed, OCC officials recently
recognized, after Dodd-Frank, that supporting their positions with evi-
dence improved their odds of success in court.352
Chris Walker recently conducted a groundbreaking study into the
views of 128 agency rule drafters,353 producing results that indicate
that Chevmore at least somewhat influences agency drafting, although
the full extent of that influence is unclear. For instance, nearly all of
the respondents agreed to some extent that agency drafters think
about judicial review when drafting.354 Relatedly, 81% of the respon-
dents agreed strongly, agreed, or somewhat agreed that “[a]gency
expectations about which level of deference (Chevron, Skidmore, no
deference, etc.) courts will apply to its statutory interpretation affect
the agency’s drafting process.”355 More specifically, 83% of the
351 See supra note 279 and accompanying text (mentioning the Senate’s most recent
effort to update judicial-review provisions of the APA).
352 See Sharkey, supra note 124, at 582 (discussing views of interviewed OCC officials).
353 See Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical
Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 703–04 (2014) (providing an empirical analysis of
Chevmore and its impact on federal agency interpretation and administration of statutes).
354 Id. at 722 (stating that 46% strongly agreed, 41% agreed, and 11% somewhat
agreed).
355 Id. at 722–23 (stating that 10% strongly agreed, 36% agreed, and 35% somewhat
agreed).
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respondents at least somewhat agreed that agencies are willing to be
more aggressive in interpretation matters when they know or strongly
believe that Chevron deference will apply.356 Conversely, Walker’s
study shows that 83% at least somewhat agreed that the agency would
be less willing to advance an aggressive interpretation if Chevron does
not apply.357
To be sure, Walker cautions readers from generalizing his find-
ings because of the predominance of the “somewhat agree” response
for each answer related to the aggressiveness of agency interpreta-
tions, the significant number of respondents who indicated that they
did not know the answer (approximately 20% of the respondents for
each question), and comments volunteered from a few respondents
indicating that Chevmore does not influence agency interpretation.358
But, despite these limitations, his study provides some evidence that
Chevmore influences agency action, and it suggests that similar affirm-
ance rates could provide some indication that Chevmore codification
is working.359 Therefore, even if it is only a myth that Chevron and
Skidmore lead to different results, that myth has purchase on agencies
and Congress.
Third. Providing agencies a statutory right to Chevron deference
could unwittingly encourage regulatory capture as courts limit their
review and as industry accumulates more influence over the agency,
but this fear does not undermine Chevmore codification’s utility. Even
under Chevron, meaningful judicial review exists that will likely pre-
vent the worst excesses of capture. The agencies’ decisions must be
reasonable, and agencies must do what Congress requires for Chevron
to apply, such as satisfying procedural or participatory requirements.
Repeated reversals may bring the agency’s possible capture to
Congress’s attention. Such fears ultimately only highlight the role that
Congress, as architect and manager of the administrative state, must
play in overseeing agencies, both before and after codifying
Chevmore. If the delegation principle underlying Chevmore means
anything, it must be that Congress has an obligation to monitor agen-
cies and make known its intent as to interpretive primacy.
356 Id. at 723 (stating that 10% strongly agreed, 33% agreed, and 40% somewhat agreed
with this statement).
357 Id. at 724 (stating that 7% strongly agreed, 31% agreed, and 45% somewhat agreed).
358 Id. at 724.
359 See id. at 725 (“The study’s findings provide strong support that agency rule drafters
think about judicial review when drafting statutes and understand Chevron and Skidmore
and how their chances in court are better under Chevron. Many rule drafters also reported
that federal agencies advance more aggressive statutory interpretations if they know
Chevron applies.”).
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CONCLUSION
Although properly considered one of the most significant statutes
governing finance and consumer protection, Dodd-Frank should be
noteworthy, too, for its implications as to administrative law. To my
knowledge, it is the first time that Congress has codified Skidmore. It
is the first time that Congress has indicated in legislative history (and
by implication in certain statutory provisions) that it accepts Chevron.
It is the first time that Congress has suggested that the judicially
crafted Chevmore doctrines and the APA’s statutory review provi-
sions coexist comfortably. It is the first time that Congress has
addressed when multiple enforcing agencies should receive Chevron
deference. By taking these unprecedented actions, Congress legiti-
mizes the delegation theory that undergirds the Chevmore doctrines,
makes its intent as to interpretive primacy better known, and places
those doctrines on firmer ground.
Dodd-Frank is instructive, too, on how Chevmore codification
can serve as a legislative tool in the future. Congress should continue
to use Chevmore codification as both a reward and a penalty to clarify
its intent as to the Chevmore doctrines. In the process, it will help
mitigate longstanding administrative-law issues. As Dodd-Frank sug-
gests, Congress will do so when agencies and courts veer too far from
congressional policy preferences or intent about the proper relation-
ship between courts and the agency at issue. By relying on Chevmore
codification going forward, Congress accepts the responsibility that
accompanies the privilege of Chevmore’s delegation theory.
